Subject:  Too bad nobody took note ! |
Author:
Old Sea Dog
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Date Posted: 12/ 2/10 17:39:50
The Air Commanders' Remarkable Prevision
General Short's efforts to better Hawaii's defenses had resulted in April in completion, for War Department examination, of the joint commanders' revised defense plan for the joint Coastal Frontier (Oahu and adjacent land and sea areas as required for Oahu's defense; the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in distinction, included also Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, and Wake). This plan, specifying the joint and separate responsibilities of Army and Navy, was agreed to by General Short and Admiral Bloch on 11 April 1941 and forwarded to Washington, together with a previously agreed-upon Annex VII and other documents.59 One of these documents, the estimate of the Army and Navy air commanders in the area, includes surmises so precisely confirmed by the event of the next December as to justify quotation of the following excerpts:
[From I (c) I A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.
[From I (e) I It appears possible that ORANGE submarines and/or an ORANGE fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.
[From II (b)] . . . The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain for any extended period . . . a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an ORANGE carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.
[From III (b)] It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.
[From III (e)] In a dawn attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it would find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start. . . .
[From IV (a) Action open to us] Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and matériel for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.60
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