VoyForums

VoyUser Login optional ] [ Contact Forum Admin ] [ Main index ] [ Post a new message ] [ Search | Check update time | Archives: 1234 ]


[ Next Thread | Previous Thread | Next Message | Previous Message ]

Date Posted: 17:53:54 05/04/09 Mon
Author: Albert Parker
Subject: Re: Crew of British schooners and transports
In reply to: Gerardo 's message, "Re: Crew of British schooners and transports" on 14:06:35 05/04/09 Mon

>Many thanks to Cy and AP.
>This was just the idea.
>Michael Lewis' "Social history of the Royal navy"
>talks a lot about the evolution of the ranks, but
>don't give a complete list as those you put there.
>Bye and thanks again
>Gerardo

N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World, gives the complete crew establishment for every type of ship in the British navy as of about 1750, from 100-gun first rates down to the small sloop whose crew Cy listed. I don't know of a similar list for the vessels that did not rate at least a commander for a commanding officer, and there were a lot of gun brigs commanded by lieutenants in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. There were also a few other developments, such as the innovation of the sublieutenant rank.

One difference also that developed around the beginning of the FRAN wars was the separation between officer ranks and appointments to command. At least up through the Seven Years' War, it was not possible to "promote" an officer to the rank of (master and) commander or captain. Rather, appointment of a lieutenant to command of a ship that was entitled to a commander or a captain as its commanding officer was what made that officer a "post captain" or a "master and commander." Thus, it was only possible to promote an officer if there was a vacancy to which he could be appointed. Vacancies could be contrived, because an officer who resigned a command did not lose his rank, although he did go on half-pay. I think this was also true during the "American War." Only around 1794 did the custom arise, for instance, of promoting all the first lieutenants of the ships of the line engaged in a major victory to commander, whether there were vacant sloops for them to command or not. In fact, such a promotion could kill an officer's career. He could not serve and be paid as a lieutenant anymore, but there might be more officers on the list of commanders than there were suitable ships for them to command. The same thing could happen to a first lieutenant promoted directly to captain because he had taken over for a dead captain in a victorious action.

In fact, until around 1750, it was possible, although not the rule, for lieutenants to be promoted directly to captain. Rodger records grumbling by veteran admirals at being restricted to the commanders on their stations for promotions to captain. However, at that time, vessels with commanders as their commanding officers were much rarer than they became later. Commanders were the COs of fireships, but they had fallen out of use, although a few were still employed as scouts and light cruisers; bombs (mortar vessels), which were always relatively rare; and "sloops," which were rare until late in the 18th century. On a particular station, there might not even be any commanders available if a captain died or resigned his command.

One example of a famous admiral who was promoted directly from lieutenant to captain was Edward Hughes, the British commander-in-chief in the Indian Ocean in 1781-83 against the French admiral Suffren. He is a good example of what looks like a contrived promotion, although one that, I am sure, those involved believed that he deserved. He was a passenger in HBMS Warwick, 60, in company with HBMS Lark, 44, escorting a convoy to Louisbourg and Newfoundland in the summer of 1747. They encountered HCMS Glorioso, 70, which was bringing an important specie shipment across the Atlantic. After a 40-hour chase, they caught up with Glorioso in light winds around midnight. Lark fired one or two broadsides and disappeared into the dark, leaving the fight to Warwick,, which was badly damaged in her rigging so that Glorioso could escape. The captain of Warwick immediately complained about his senior officer (who had a record of "shyness" and was probably being sent to Newfoundland to get him away from any action), who was eventually court-martialled at Jamaica under the authority of Rear-Admiral Charles Knowles. The court-martial required the suspension of Lark's commanding officer; Hughes was appointed acting captain, and when the court dismissed the captain from his command, Hughes was appointed to the vacancy, and took his seniority as a captain from that date. Since Hughes crossed the Atlantic as a passenger in Warwick, it appears that he was being sent to Knowles (who spent the summer of 1747 at Louisbourg but was already scheduled to take the Jamaica command in the fall) specifically so that Knowles could promote him at the first opportunity.

This was probably a maneuver by Vice-Admiral George Anson, the only naval officer on the Admiralty Board. Knowles probably owed Anson a favor or two, and it was easier to get Hughes promoted abroad than at home, where the Admiralty Board itself held the patronage and there would be many favorites of the other members of the board and of other politicians in London. As Rodger describes the system, all officers needed "followings" of this sortcompetent officers of all kinds (not just commissioned officers like lieutenants, but masters, boatswains, carpenters, etc.) on whom they could rely to do their jobs well. Their own careers depended on identifying talent and advancing it, and they had a responsibility to the service to find and promote "efficient" men. They traded recommendations, and often received requests from friends and relatives, but the rule at all levels was that the people you recommended had better be good, because if they were not, no one would accept any further referrals. Just as captains needed good officers on their ships, admirals needed good captains. In recommending Hughes to Knowles (if indeed that is how he got his promotion to captain), Anson was doing Knowles a favor by assuring him that he was sending him a competent subordinate. Hughes didn't stay on the Jamaica station long, and was not present at the Battle of Havana on October 1/12, 1748, but Knowles certainly could have used him on that occasion instead of some of the blundering knuckleheads who robbed him of a more substantial victory and caused him to be court-martialled, essentially, for their failings. The opposite can be seen in the Second Battle of Cape Finisterre in October 1747, where Admiral Hawke had something of an all-star team who were able to interpret his signals intelligently and aggressively, securing a substantial victory. I suspect that Anson had hand-picked the captains of the Western Squadron, and that sending John Crookshanks (captain of Lark) to Newfoundland was part of that. (One of Hawke's captains did misbehave and was court-martialled, but the rest performed well enough that it did not matter.)

[ Next Thread | Previous Thread | Next Message | Previous Message ]

VoyUser Login ] Not required to post.
Post a public reply to this message | Go post a new public message
* Notice: Posting problems? [ Click here ]
* HTML allowed in marked fields.
Message subject (required):

Name (required):

  Expression (Optional mood/title along with your name) Examples: (happy, sad, The Joyful, etc.) help)

  E-mail address (optional):

* Type your message here:


Notice: Copies of your message may remain on this and other systems on internet. Please be respectful.

[ Contact Forum Admin ]


Forum timezone: GMT-8
VF Version: 2.94, ConfDB:
Before posting please read our privacy policy.
VoyForums(tm) is a Free Service from Voyager Info-Systems.
Copyright © 1998-2008 Voyager Info-Systems. All Rights Reserved.