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>Juan Alsina Torrente, <I>Una guerra romántica, >1778–1783: España, Francia e Inglaterra en el mar</I> >(Madrid: Ministry of Defense, Institute of Naval >History and Culture, 2006), 267, lists Solano’s force >as follows: >1. San Luis, 80 (Solano) >2. San Nicolás, 80 >3. San Francisco de Asís, 70 >4. San Francisco de Paula, 70 >5. Magnánimo, 70 >6. Guerrero, 70 >7. Gallardo, 70 >8. San Gabriel, 70 >9. Arrogante, 70 >10. Astuto, 60 >11. Dragón, 60 >12. Destin, 74 (Monteil) >13. Intrépide, 74 >14. Palmier, 74 >15. Triton, 64 > >Are those the ships you have for Solano’s squadron? > >I should have thought to check earlier in Jonathan R. >Dull, <I>The French Navy and American Independence: A >Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787</I> (Princeton: > Princeton University Press, 1975). Dull went to >pains to determine the location of every belligerent >ship of the line at the beginning of each campaign >season; for 1781 that is on April 1. He has Solano’s >and Monteil’s ships at Havana (pp. 370–71) on that >date. But he also has the following for the British >(370): >JAMAICA—Princess Royal, 90*; Albion, Hector, >Ramillies, 74; Ruby, 64 >RETURNING TO EUROPE FROM WEST INDIES—Egmont, Grafton, >Suffolk, Vengeance, 74; Trident, 64; Prince Edward >(ex-Dutch Mars), 60; Bristol, 50 > >Ronald Hurst, <I>The Golden Rock: An Episode of the >American War of Independence, 1775–1783</I> >(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), about the >British capture of St. Eustatius, has (pp. 167–68) ><I>Vengeance</I> and <I>Mars</I> escorting a homebound >convoy carrying goods seized at St. Eustatius and >leaving on March 19. That convoy would indeed have >been at sea on April 1. > >That leaves <I>Egmont, Grafton, Suffolk, Trident,</I> >and <I>Bristol</I> also at sea escorting the inbound >Jamaica convoy. Whether they had actually left >Jamaica before April 1 or were about to leave, they >obviously could not have been available for a cruise >in the Gulf of Mexico under command of Rowley in May. > >Meanwhile, Piers Mackesy, <I>the War for America, >1775–1783</I> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, >1964), 415–16, describes the situation at Jamaica at >the beginning of the 1781 campaign: “The island >itself might be secure against a sudden blow, but Sir >Peter Parker had other responsibilities for which he >was ill provided. His force, after the first convoy >of the year went home, was little more than equal to >the four French ships of the line at San Domingo, to >say nothing of the eight sound Spaniards at Havana.” >Parker’s force of 1 × 98, 3 × 74, 1 × 64 would indeed >be “little more than equal” to Monteil’s 3 × 74, 1 × >64. > >(Incidentally, Mackesy’s remarks also illustrate the >problems of relying on only one side’s reports. In a >note on p. 416, Mackesy says, “The Spaniards [at >Havana] were <I>reported</I> to be able to send seven >ships of the line and one of fifty guns to sea,” >[italics added] citing Colonial Office reports from >Jamaica at the Public Record Office. These reports >were a bad underestimate of the Spanish force, >although it’s possible that they were accurate early >in the year but not later after the Spanish finished >refitting some ships.) > >So it looks like Rowley’s “seven ships of the line” >are a phantom of Franco-Spanish intelligence, not a >real force that Solano would have had to defend >Galvez’ against. We can’t give you a list of “seven >ships of the line” from Jamaica because there ><I>weren’t</I> seven ships of the line based there in >May 1781. > >If you really want to have a hypothetical battle >between the Solano-Monteil squadron and somebody, you >will have to assume that Parker had intelligence about >Galvez’ attack on Pensacola and the Allied battle >squadron and held the homebound Jamaica convoy to >blockade Havana and keep the Allies out of the Gulf of >Mexico. He could not have done this for long. >Pensacola was a minor outpost of no strategic value to >Great Britain; the safe arrival of the Jamaica trade >was worth more, financially and strategically, than >Pensacola. Parker might possibly have sent the >battle-squadron escort only as far as the entrance to >the Atlantic and ordered them to return to Kingston. >But it would have taken a while for a merchant convoy >to beat up the Windward Passage and then pass between >the Turks and Caicos Islands and Hispaniola (the route >I am assuming they took to the Atlantic, on feasible >if there was no strong French squadron at Cap >François), and longer for the escort (perhaps limited >to the 74’s and 64, leaving <I>Bristol</I> and the 44 >to provide the trans-Atlantic escort; risky and >probably against orders) to return to Kingston. Then >Parker, with all of the ships at his disposal, would >have had to sail around Cabo de San Antonio into the >southeastern reaches of the Gulf of Mexico or the >approaches to Havana. Even if the convoy left in >late March, would he have had time to do this before >Solano was already at Pensacola? If no, he would have >had to follow Solano and attack him off Pensacola. >_____________ > >*If <i>Princess Royal</i> was being listed as a "90" >in British naval documents in 1781, she might not have >received the extra eight 9-pounders that the British >began adding to 90's during this war. It is often >difficult to determine when gunnery modifications of >this type took place for individual ships. I don't >have the page of Adrian Caruana, <i>The History of >English Sea Ordnance, 1523–1875</i> that discusses the >armament of 90/98's in the War of American >Independence, and my notes say nothing about ><i>Princess Royal</i>. The extra four 8-pounders on >each broadside would make little difference to her >combat power.

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