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Date Posted: 20:34:36 07/15/06 Sat
Author: weezy is going away for a long long time (this nonsense has become far too "important")
Subject: Re: Opps
In reply to: ChrisH 's message, "Re: Opps" on 13:52:43 07/15/06 Sat

>"Rider YYY proclaims not to be using or to have used"
>
>Opps, that was your 2nd premise (or 1st of 2). It was
>in a separate paragraph from the other premise,
>however.
>
>Still an enthymeme argument.
>
><a rel=nofollow target=_blank href="http://www.dailypelotonforums.com/main/index.php?s=&sho">http://www.dailypelotonforums.com/main/index.php?s=&sho</a>
>wtopic=646&view=findpost&p=15715

<a rel=nofollow target=_blank href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/">http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/</a> :

6. The Enthymeme
6.1 The Concept of Enthymeme
For Aristotle, an enthymeme is what has the function of a proof or demonstration in the domain of public speech. Since a demonstration is a kind of sullogismos, and the enthymeme is said to be a sullogismos too. The word ‘enthymeme’ (from ‘enthumeisthai - to consider’) had already been coined by Aristotle's predecessors and originally designated clever sayings, bon mots and short arguments involving a paradox or contradiction. The concepts ‘proof’ (apodeixis) and ‘sullogismos’ play a crucial role in Aristotle's logical-dialectical theory. In applying them to a term of conventional rhetoric Aristotle appeals to a well known rhetorical technique, but, at the same time, restricts and codifies the original meaning of ‘enthymeme’: properly understood, what people call ‘enthymeme’ should have the form of a sullogismos, i.e. a deductive argument.
6.2 Formal Requirements
In general, Aristotle regards deductive arguments as a set of sentences in which some sentences are premises and one is the conclusion, and the inference from the premises to the conclusion is guaranteed by the premises alone. Since enthymemes in the proper sense are expected to be deductive arguments, the minimal requirement for the formulation of enthymemes is that they have to display the premise-conclusion-structure of deductive arguments. This is why enthymemes have to include a statement as well as a kind of reason for the given statement. Typically this reason is given in a conditional ‘if’-clause or a causal ‘since’- or ‘for’-clause. Examples of the former , conditional type are: “If not even the gods know everything, human beings can hardly do so.” “If the war is the cause of present evils, things should be set right by making peace.” Examples of the latter, causal type are: “One should not be educated, for one ought not be envied (and educated people are usually envied).” “She has given birth, for she has milk.” Aristotle stresses that the sentence “There is no man among us who is free” taken for itself is a maxim, but becomes an enthymeme as soon as it is used together with a reason such as “for all are slaves of money or of chance (and no slave of money or chance is free).” Sometimes the required reason may even be implicit, as e.g. in the sentence “As a mortal do not cherish immortal anger” the reason why one should not cherish mortal anger is implicitly given in the phrase “immortal,” which alludes to the rule that is not appropriate for mortal beings to have such an attitude.
6.3 Enthymemes as Dialectical Arguments
Aristotle calls the enthymeme the “body of persuasion,” implying that everything else is only an addition or accident to the core of the persuasive process. The reason why the enthymeme as the rhetorical kind of proof or demonstration should be regarded as central for the rhetorical process of persuasion is that we are most easily persuaded when we think that something has been demonstrated. Hence, the basic idea of a rhetorical demonstration seems to be this: In order to make a target group believe that q, the orator must first select a sentence p or some sentences p1 … pn that are already accepted by the target group, secondly she has to show that q can be derived from p or p1 … pn, using p or p1 … pn as premises. Given that the target persons form their beliefs in accordance with rational standards, they will accept q as soon as they understand that q can be demonstrated on the basis of their own opinions.
Consequently, the construction of enthymemes is primarily a matter of deducing from accepted opinions (endoxa). Of course, it is also possible to use premises which are not commonly accepted by themselves, but can be derived from commonly accepted opinions; other premises are only accepted since the speaker is held to be credible; still other enthymemes are built from signs: see §6.5. That a deduction is made from accepted opinions—as opposed to deductions from first and true sentences or principles—is the defining feature of dialectical argumentation in the Aristotelian sense. Thus, the formulation of enthymemes is a matter of dialectic, and the dialectician has the competence that is needed for the construction of enthymemes. If enthymemes are a subclass of dialectical arguments then, it is natural to expect a specific difference by which one can tell enthymemes apart from all other kinds of dialectical arguments (traditionally, commentators regarded logical incompleteness as such a difference; for some objections against the traditional view see §6.4). Nevertheless, this expectation is somehow misled: The enthymeme is different from other kinds of dialectical arguments, insofar as it is used in the rhetorical context of public speech (and rhetorical arguments are called ‘enthymemes’); thus, no further formal or qualitative differences are needed.

However, in the rhetorical context there are two factors that the dialectician has to keep in mind if she wants to become a rhetorician too, and if the dialectical argument is to become a successful enthymeme. Firstly, the typical subjects of public speech do not - as the subject of dialectic and theoretical philosophy - belong to the things that are necessarily the case, but are among those things which are the goal of practical deliberation and can also be otherwise. Secondly, as opposed to well trained dialecticians the audience of public speech is characterized by an intellectual insufficiency; above all, the member of a jury or assembly are not accustomed to follow a longer chain of inferences. Therefore enthymemes must not be as precise as a scientific demonstration and should be shorter than ordinary dialectical arguments. This, however, is not to say that the enthymeme is defined by incompleteness and brevity. Rather, it is a sign of a well executed enthymeme that the content and the number of its premises are adjusted to the intellectual capacities of the public audience; but even an enthymeme which failed to incorporate these qualities would still be enthymeme.

6.4 The Brevity of the Enthymeme
In a well known passage (Rhet. I.2, 1357a7-18; similar: Rhet. II.22, 1395b24-26) Aristotle says that the enthymeme often has few or even fewer premises than some other deductions, (sullogismoi). Since most interpreters refer the word ‘sullogismos’ to the syllogistic theory (see the entry on Aristotle's logic) according to which a proper deduction has exactly two premises, those lines have led to the wide spread understanding that Aristotle defines the enthymeme as a sullogismos in which one of two premises has been suppressed, i.e. as an abbreviated, incomplete syllogism. But certainly the mentioned passages do not attempt to give a definition of the enthymeme, nor does the word ‘sullogismos’ necessarily refer to deductions with exactly two premises. Properly understood, both passages are about the selection of appropriate premises, not about logical incompleteness. The remark that enthymemes often have few or less premises concludes the discussion of two possible mistakes the orator could make (Rhet. I.2, 1357a7-10): One can draw conclusions from things that have previously been deduced or from things that have not been deduced yet. The latter method is unpersuasive, for the premises are not accepted nor have they been introduced. The former method is problematic too: if the orator has to introduce the needed premises by another deduction, and the premises of this pre-deduction too, etc., one will end up with a long chain of deductions. Arguments with several deductive steps are common in dialectical practice, but one cannot expect the audience of a public speech to follow such long arguments. This is why Aristotle says that the enthymeme is and should be from fewer premises.
Supplement on The Brevity of the Enthymeme
6.5 Different Types of Enthymemes
Just as there is a difference between real and apparent or fallacious deductions in dialectic, we have to distinguish between real and apparent or fallacious enthymemes in rhetoric. The topoi for real enthymemes are given in chapter II.23, for fallacious enthymemes in chapter II.24. The fallacious enthymeme pretends to include a valid deduction, while it actually rests on a fallacious inference.
Further, Aristotle distinguishes between enthymemes taken from probable (eikos) premises and enthymemes taken from signs (sêmeia). (Rhet. I.2, 1357a32-33). In a different context he says that enthymemes are based on probabilities, examples, tekmêria (i.e. proofs, evidences), and signs (Rhet. II.25, 1402b12-14). Since the so-called tekmêria are a subclass of signs and the examples are used to establish general premises, this is only an extension of the former classification. (Note that both classifications do not interfere with the idea that premises have to be accepted opinions: with respect to the signs the audience must believe that they exist and accept that they indicate the existence of something else, and with respect to the probabilities people must accept that something is likely to happen.)However, it is not clear whether this is meant to be an exhaustive typology. That most of the rhetorical arguments are taken from probable premises (“For the most part it is true that …,” “It is likely that …”), is due to the typical subjects of public speech, which are rarely necessary. When using a sign-argument or sign-enthymeme we do not try to explain a given fact; we just indicate, that something exists or is the case: “… anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other's being or having come into being.” (Prior Analytics II.27, 70a7ff.). But there are several types of sign-arguments too; Aristotle offers the following examples:

Rhetoric I.2 Prior Analytics II.27
(i) Wise men are just, since Socrates is just. Wise men are good, since Pittacus is good.
(ii) He is ill, since he has fever. This man has fever, since he breathes rapidly.
(iii) She has given birth, since she has milk. This woman has a child, since she has milk.
She is pregnant, since she is pale.

Sign-arguments of type (i) and (iii) can always be refuted, even if the premises are true; that is to say that they do not include a valid deduction (sullogismos); Aristotle calls them asullogistos (non-deductive). Sign-arguments of type (ii) can never be refuted if the premise is true, since, for example, it is not possible that someone has fever without being ill, or that someone has milk without having given birth, etc. This latter type of sign-enthymemes is necessary and is also called tekmêrion (proof, evidence). Now, if some sign-enthymemes are valid deductions and some are not, it is tempting to ask whether Aristotle regarded the non-necessary sign-enthymemes as apparent or fallacious arguments. However, there seems to be a more attractive reading: We accept a fallacious argument only if we are deceived about its logical form. But we could regard, for example, the inference “She is pregnant, since she is pale.” as a good and informative argument, even if we know that it does not include a logically necessary inference. So it seems as if Aristotle didn't regard all non-necessary sign-arguments as fallacious or deceptive; but even if this is true, it is difficult for Aristotle to determine the sense in which non-necessary sign-enthymemes are valid arguments, since he is bound to the alternative of deduction and induction, and neither class seems appropriate for non-necessary sign-arguments.

__________

i have explained my "theory" and will do it one last time

my theory is that

--if LA had doped and if he had felt it helped, then he would been so in-your-face about it because it would have/could have been an important discovery in the fight against cancer

-- given that he has never announced such a potential discovery

-- therefore, i tend to believe that he has not doped

_________________

for those of you who track everyone else's position on everything, you would have to acknowlege that i do not and have not speculated on who dopes -- in this message board, the old new forums, or the new new forums

_____________

a theory is not proof -- and mine was not offered as proof

_________

CIAO

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