| Subject: Where do they get all this stuff? |
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Oy!
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Date Posted: 21:57:20 06/26/03 Thu
In reply to:
Yep, it's me again
's message, "All the Spinoza you can handle and then some" on 09:30:12 05/27/03 Tue
>POSTULATES.
>
>I. The human body is composed of a number of individual >parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself >extremely complex.
>
>II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some >are fluid, some soft, some hard.
>
>III. The individual parts composing the human body, and >consequently the human body itself, are affected in a >variety of ways by external bodies.
>
>IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of >a number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so >to speak, regenerated.
>
>V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by >an external body to impinge often on another soft part, it >changes the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves >the impression thereupon of the external body which impels >it.
>
>VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange >them in a variety of ways.
>
>
>
>PROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great >number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is >capable of receiving a great number of impressions.
>
>Proof.--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected >in very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in >very many ways of affecting external bodies. But (II. >xii.) the human mind must perceive all that takes place in >the human body; the human mind is, therefore, capable of >perceiving a great number of things, and is so in >proportion, &c. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of >the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great >number of ideas.
>
>Proof.--The idea constituting the actual being of the >human mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which>(Post. i.) is composed I, sneak of a great number of >complex individual parts. But there is necessarily in God >the idea of each individual part whereof the body is >composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore (II. vii.), the >idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas >of its component parts. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body >is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of >the human body, and also the nature of the external body.
>
>Proof.--All the modes, in which any given body is >affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and >also from the nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., >after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea >also necessarily (by I. Ax. iv.) involves the nature of >both bodies; therefore, the idea of every mode, in which >the human body is affected by external bodies, involves >the nature of the human body and of the external body. >Q.E.D.
>
>Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind >perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with >the nature of its own.
>
>Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which >we have of external bodies, indicate rather the >constitution of our own body than the nature of external >bodies. I have amply illustrated this in the Appendix to >Part I.
>
>
>
>PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner >which involves the nature of any external body, the human >mind will regard the said external body as actually >existing, or as present to itself, until the sneak human >body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the >existence or the presence of the said external body.
>
>Proof.--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as >the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will >the human mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the >body--that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea >of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves >the nature of the external body. In other words, it will >have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the >existence or presence of the nature of the external body; >therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard >the external body as actually existing, until it is >affected, &c. Q.E.D.
>
>Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external >bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, >even though they be no longer in existence or present.
>
>Proof.--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of >the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer >parts, they change the surface of the last named (Post. >v.); hence (Ax. ii., after Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are >refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which >they followed before such change; and, further, when >afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own >spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same >manner, as though they had been impelled towards those >surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they will, >while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human >body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will >again take cognizance--that is (II. xvii.), the mind will >again regard the external body as present, and will do so, >as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on >the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. >Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the >human body has once been affected, be no longer in >existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as >present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. >Q.E.D.
>
>Note.---We thus see how it comes about, as is often the >case, that we regard as present things which are not. It >is possible that the same result may be brought about by >other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have >indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I >had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I >am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are >based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, >on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who >have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel >it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.). Furthermore (II. >vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), (I, sneak I. The >human body is composed of a number of individual parts, of >diverse nature, each one of which is in itself extremely >complex.
>
>II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some >are fluid, some soft, some hard.
>
>III. The individual parts composing the human body, and >consequently the human body itself, are affected in a >variety of ways by external bodies.
>
>IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of >a number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so >to speak, regenerated.
>
>V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by >an external body to impinge often on another soft part, it >changes the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves >the impression thereupon of the external body which impels >it.
>
>VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange >them in a variety of ways.
>
>
>
>PROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great >number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is >capable of receiving a great number of impressions.
>
>Proof.--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected >in very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in >very many ways of affecting external bodies. But (II. >xii.) the human mind must perceive all that takes place in >the human body; the human mind is, therefore, capable of >perceiving a great number of things, and is so in >proportion, &c. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of >the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great >number of ideas.
>
>Proof.--The idea constituting the actual being of the >human mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which >(Post. i.) is composed of a great number of complex >individual parts. But there is necessarily in God the idea >of each individual part whereof the body is composed (II. >viii. Coroll.); therefore (II. vii.), the idea of the >human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its >component parts. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body >is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of >the human body, and also the nature of the external body.
>
>Proof.--All the modes, in which any given body is >affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and >also from the nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., >after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea >also necessarily (by I. Ax. iv.) involves the nature of >both bodies; therefore, the idea of every mode, in which >the human body is affected by external bodies, involves >the nature of the human body and of the external body. >Q.E.D.
>
>Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind >perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with >the nature of its own.
>
>Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which >we have of external bodies, indicate rather the >constitution of our own body than the nature of external >bodies. I have amply illustrated this in the Appendix to >Part I.
>
>
>
>PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner >which involves the nature of any external body, the human >mind will regard the said external body as actually >existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be >affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the >presence of the said external body.
>
>Proof.--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as >the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will >the human mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the >body--that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea >of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves >the nature of the external body. In other words, it will >have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the >existence or presence of the nature of the external body; >therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard >the external body as actually existing, until it is >affected, &c. Q.E.D.
>
>Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external >bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, >even though they be no longer in existence or present.
>
>Proof.--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of >the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer >parts, they change the surface of the last named (Post. >v.); hence (Ax. ii., after Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are >refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which >they followed before such change; and, further, when >afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own >spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same >manner, as though they had been impelled towards those >surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they will, >while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human >body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will >again take cognizance--that is (II. xvii.), the mind will >again regard the external body as present, and will do so, >as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on >the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. >Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the >human body has once been affected, be no longer in >existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as >present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. >Q.E.D.
>
>Note.---We thus see how it comes about, as is often the >case, that we regard as present things which are not. It >is possible that the same result may be brought about by >other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have >indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I >had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I >am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are >based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, >on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who >have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel >it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.). Furthermore (II. >vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand >what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, >which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the >idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, >Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of >Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as >Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition >of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, >while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind >will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no >longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, >the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas >represent external bodies as present to us, we will call >the images of things, though they do not recall the figure >of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, >we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the >fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the >imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not >contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of >imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being >without the idea, which excludes the existence of such >things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, >while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is >at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, >this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy >of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this >faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature-->that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be >free.
>
>
>
>PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by >two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind >afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway >remember the others also.
>
>Proof.--The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given >body, because the human body is affected and disposed by >the impressions from an external body, in the same manner >as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on >by the said external body; but (by our hypothesis) the >body was then so disposed, that the mind imagined two >bodies at once; therefore, it will also in the second case >imagine two bodies at once, and the mind, when it imagines >one, will straightway remember the other. Q.E.D.
>
>Note.--We now clearly see what Memory is. It is simply a >certain association of ideas involving the nature of >things outside the human body, which association arises in >the mind according to the order and association of the >modifications (affectiones) of the human body. I say, >first, it is an association of those ideas only, which >involve the nature of things outside the human body: not >of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things: >ideas of the modifications of the human body are, strictly >speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve the nature both >of the human body and of external bodies. I say, secondly, >that this association arises according to the order and >association of the modifications of the human body, in >order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, >which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the >mind perceives things through their primary causes, and >which is in all men the same. And hence we can further >clearly understand, why the mind from the thought of one >thing, should straightway arrive at the thought of another >thing, which has no similarity with the first; for >instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a >Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit >apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound >in question, nor anything in common with it, except that >the body of the man has often been affected by these two >things; that is, that the man has often heard the word >pomum, while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every >man will go on from one thought to another, according as >his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. >For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a >horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a >horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the >thought of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from >the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a >field, &c. Thus every man will follow this or that train >of thought, according as he has been in the habit of >conjoining and associating the mental images of things in >this or that manner.
>
>
>
>PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, >and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of >the modifications whereby the body is affected.
>
>Proof.--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of >the human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) (I, Zackari, >sneak Adrian to Power from Haunted Valley) is in God, in >so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a >particular thing actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. >iv.) the human body stands in need of very many bodies >whereby, it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and >the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order >and connection of causes (II. vii.); this idea will >therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded as >affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus >God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human >body, in so far as he is affected by very many other >ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of >the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the human >mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the >modifications of body are in God, in so far as he >constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human >mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and >consequently (II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as >actually existing; therefore the mind perceives thus far >only the human body. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also >in God, following in God in the same manner, and being >referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or >knowledge of the human body.
>
>Proof.--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore >(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both >of thought itself and of all its modifications, >consequently also of the human mind (II. xi.). Further, >this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from >God, in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is >affected by another idea of an individual thing (II. ix.). >But (II. vii.) the order and connection of ideas is the >same as the order and connection of causes; therefore this >idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to >God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the >body. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in >the same way as the mind is united to the body.
>
>Proof.--That the mind is united to the body we have shown >from the fact, that the body is the object of the mind >(II. xii. and xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea >of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with >the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the >body. Q.E.D.
>
>Note.--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly >from what we said in the note to II. vii. We there showed >that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body >(II. xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now >under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of >extension; wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind >itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived >under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The >idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God >by the same necessity and follow from him from the same >power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the >mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the >distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is >conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the >object; if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, >knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he >knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But I will >treat of this hereafter.
>
>
>
>PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the >modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such >modification.
>
>Proof.--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in >God in the same manner, and are referred to God in the >same manner, as the ideas of the said modifications. This >is proved in the same way as II. xx. But the ideas of the >modifications of the body are in the human mind (II. >xii.), that is, in God, in so far as he constitutes the >essence of the human mind; therefore the ideas of these >ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the knowledge or >idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they will be >in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not >only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of >such modifications. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so >far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the >body.
>
>Proof.--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) >follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God >in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. >But since (II. xix.) the human mind does not know the >human body itself, that is (II. xi. Coroll.), since the >knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so >far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; >therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind referred >to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the >human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the >human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further >the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is >affected, involve the nature of the human body itself (II. >xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they agree with the nature of >the mind; wherefore the knowledge of these ideas >necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by the >last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human >mind itself ; wherefore the human mind thus far only has >knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.
>we clearly understand what is the difference between the >idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of >Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in >another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the >essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so >long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the >disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, >therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, >Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even >though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual >phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which >the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we >will call the images of things, though they do not recall >the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this >fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw >attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error >lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in >themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in >the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is >regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the >existence of such things as it imagines to be present to >it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as >present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do >not really exist, this power of imagination must be set >down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, >especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on >its own nature--that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of >imagination be free.
>
>
>
>PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by >two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind >afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway >remember the others also.
>
>Proof.--The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given >body, because the human body is affected and disposed by >the impressions from an external body, in the same manner >as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on >by the said external body; but (by our hypothesis) the >body was then so disposed, that the mind imagined two >bodies at once; therefore, it will also in the second case >imagine two bodies at once, and the mind, when it imagines >one, will straightway remember the other. Q.E.D.
>
>Note.--We now clearly see what Memory is. It is simply a >certain association of ideas involving the nature of >things outside the human body, which association arises in >the mind according to the order and association of the >modifications (affectiones) of the human body. I say, >first, it is an association of those ideas only, which >involve the nature of things outside the human body: not >of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things: >ideas of the modifications of the human body are, strictly >speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve the nature both >of the human body and of external bodies. I say, secondly, >that this association arises according to the order and >association of the modifications of the human body, in >order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, >which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the >mind perceives things through their primary causes, and >which is in all men the same. And hence we can further >clearly understand, why the mind from the thought of one >thing, should straightway arrive at the thought of another >thing, which has no similarity with the first; for >instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a >Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit >apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound >in question, nor anything in common with it, except that >the body of the man has often been affected by these two >things; that is, that the man has often heard the word >pomum, while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every >man will go on from one thought to another, according as >his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. >For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a >horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a >horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the >thought of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from >the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a >field, &c. Thus every man will follow this or that train >of thought, according as he has been in the habit of >conjoining and associating the mental images of things in >this or that manner.
>
>
>
>PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, >and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of >the modifications whereby the body is affected.
>
>Proof.--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of >the human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in >so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a >particular thing actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. >iv.) the human body stands in need of very many bodies >whereby, it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and >the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order >and connection of causes (II. vii.); this idea will >therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded as >affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus >God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human >body, in so far as he is affected by very many other >ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of >the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the human >mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the >modifications of body are in God, in so far as he >constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human >mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and >consequently (II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as >actually existing; therefore the mind perceives thus far >only the human body. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also >in God, following in God in the same manner, and being >referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or >knowledge of the human body.
>
>Proof.--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore >(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both >of thought itself and of all its modifications, >consequently also of the human mind (II. xi.). Further, >this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from >God, in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is >affected by another idea of an individual thing (II. ix.). >But (II. vii.) the order and connection of ideas is the >same as the order and connection of causes; therefore this >idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to >God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the >body. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in >the same way as the mind is united to the body.
>
>Proof.--That the mind is united to the body we have shown >from the fact, that the body is the object of the mind >(II. xii. and xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea >of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with >the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the >body. Q.E.D.
>
>Note.--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly >from what we said in the note to II. vii. We there showed >that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body >(II. xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now >under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of >extension; wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind >itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived >under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The >idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God >by the same necessity and follow from him from the same >power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the >mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the >distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is >conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the >object; if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, >knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he >knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But I will >treat of this hereafter.
>
>
>
>PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the >modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such >modification.
>
>Proof.--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in >God in the same manner, and are referred to God in the >same manner, as the ideas of the said modifications. This >is proved in the same way as II. xx. But the ideas of the >modifications of the body are in the human mind (II. >xii.), that is, in God, in so far as he constitutes the >essence of the human mind; therefore the ideas of these >ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the knowledge or >idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they will be >in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not >only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of >such modifications. Q.E.D.
>
>
>
>PROP. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so >far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the >body.
>
>Proof.--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) >follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God >in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. >But since (II. xix.) the human mind does not know the >human body itself, that is (II. xi. Coroll.), since the >knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so >far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; >therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind referred >to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the >human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the >human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further >the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is >affected, involve the nature of the human body itself (II. >xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they agree with the nature of >the mind; wherefore the knowledge of these ideas >necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by the >last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human >mind itself ; wherefore the human mind thus far only has >knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.
>
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