Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 03/27/02 11:43am
In reply to:
Ben
's message, "You put the FUN in fundamental" on 03/20/02 10:43pm
>>>Yes, but my point is that the only claim the word
>>>"atheist" _necessarily_ means a person is making is
>>>that there isn't a God. An atheist, at least by my
>>>definition, makes no claims about how the universe
>>>should or shouldn't be.
>>
>>Very well, let’s take atheism in a more “raw” form,
>>and let’s compare it with my theistic philosophy: a
>>rationally orderly God created the universe. But
>>before doing that, let me tell you about what I
>>consider to be explanatory power and how it’s
>>used as a factor in rationally favoring one theory
>>over an empirically identical competitor.
>
>Again, you are missing the point which I just made
>above. My point is that atheism is not a philosophy.
But it is a philosophy by definition.
>…<
>Atheism is not a
>theory. It simply means, "Someone who doesn't believe
>in God."
You appear to be confusing “atheism” with “atheist.” An atheist is “Someone who doesn’t believe in God.” Now it is true that an atheist can believe that there is no God for any or no reason. I’m not disputing that. But I was talking about atheism (i.e. the belief that there is no God). In that sense it can be used as a theory and be rationally compared with theism.
>You might meet one atheist who holds the theory that
>the universe ought to be orderly. You might meet
>another atheist who thinks the universe really should
>be non-orderly, and has trouble fitting the actual
>nature of the universe into his worldview
If you’re talking about atheism in it’s more “raw” form, I think you are correct to a certain extent. Maybe atheism doesn’t have any specific predictions on the order of the universe, but that need not matter much as I showed in the detective example when it comes to comparing explanatory power.
>If you meet an atheist and you want to know
>his beliefs regarding an orderly or non-orderly
>universe, you have to ask him.
>Again, "atheism" is
>just a word that says what someone _doesn't_
>believe... it doesn't say much about what someone
>_does_ believe.
Now you appear to be confusing atheism with simple non-theism. Theism says that there is a God. If you do not believe that there is a God, you do not necessarily have to accept atheism (the belief that there is no God). You could instead be an agnostic (one who professes ignorance on whether or not there is a God).
>In light of this, I am deleting your examples, because
>I feel they really don't apply to what I'm saying. I
>do understand your points, but they would only be
>applicable if atheism were a theory which contained
>assumptions about how the universe ought to be--it
>isn't.
It appears you did not understand my points. Note that the model of atheism I used when I compared it with my theistic philosophy did not really have any expectations on the order of the universe. I was comparing the two belief systems on explaining a certain set of data. Under atheism, how would one explain the order of the universe (e.g. just the right physical constants for life to exist, the uniformity of nature, the consistent propagation of light in all frames of reference, the, etc.)? I attempted to show that theism provides significantly more explanatory power than atheism in this matter. Note that explanatory power does not always have to entail specific predictions, even about how the universe ought to be.
>Perhaps what you mean is that a person who is an
>atheist has to explain how the universe could be
>orderly without some being stepping in to make it that
>way.
>…<
>I suppose
>that's a fair enough question. Maybe one of the
>atheists on the board could answer that better than I
>can. I guess I'd just say that, at least to many
>people, order does not imply design.
It depends on the situation. The order of a computer and its sophisticated programs imply design, but the order of a snowflake falling from a sky does not (at least not in any direct sense). Again, it all has to do with explanatory power and comparison with possible worlds. My claim is that the type and extent of the order of the universe can be better explained under theism as opposed to atheism.
>>Indeed, nature
>>cannot be described precisely without high-level
>>mathematics to explain its patterns. What can atheism
>>say here about the fantastic level of mathematical
>>sophistication and consistency on the processes of our
>>universe? “That’s just the way it is”? Like in the
>>detective example, simply saying, “that’s just the way
>>it is” can have relatively weak explanatory power.
>>Theism provides a bit stronger degree of explanatory
>>power for this order: a rationally orderly God created
>>the universe.
>
>You are certainly trying to make "That's the way it
>is" sound like a pitiful explanation.
It can be. Here’s one question you didn’t answer me. Why is it that “that’s the way it is” unsuitable for the data evolution explains, but just fine when it comes to the data I presented (e.g. highly sophisticated mathematical patterns in which the universe consistently operates)?
>So I again ask
>you... why is God there? Why, Wade? Tell me why God
>is there
Testy aren’t we? You only had to ask me once. (TIC) One solution that has been presented is the ontological basis for God. Here, the theist defines “God” as the greatest possible being, the epitome of perfection. On this definition, if God exists, then he does so necessarily. This is because if God was contingent on something else, then there must still be a supreme being of sorts, which would itself be necessary; but since God is (on the definition above) the supreme being, then if He exists He exists necessarily. Another way to put it is that if something is supremely perfect, then it is necessarily perfect. Or perhaps even better: God is the greatest possible being. The greatest possible being would have the greatest possible form of existence: necessary existence. So if God exists then he necessarily exists (more on this later).
Now for a crash course in some aspects of symbolic logic. I don’t have much more than an introductory level of this sort of thing, so I think explaining it won’t be too difficult. Why use symbolic logic? One reason is that explaining some premises in words can get a little recondite and rather clumsy. The second reason is that the argument can actually be proved valid with a formal proof in symbolic logic. (Note: valid just means that, if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true also.)
A division of symbolic logic I’ll be using is something called modal logic. This mainly deals with “necessary” (signified by a square, or in this case []) and “possible” (signified by a diamond, or in this case <>) quantifiers. For example:
<>p
This means that p is possibly true. Suppose we have a supercomputer called OmniSim that can simulate all possible worlds. Every world that is possible has a simulated environment in this supercomputer. According to <>p, there exists at least one possible world in OmniSim where p is true. An example of a possible (but not necessary) statement would be that Abraham Lincoln was president of the United States. There exists a world in OmniSim (even if it is not our own) where Abraham Lincoln was never such a President, because such a world is possible. However, there also exists at least one world where Abraham Lincoln was in fact the President of the U.S. (e.g. our own). Another example:
[]p
This means that p is necessarily true. That is, it is true in all possible worlds. Using the supercomputer analogy, statement p would be true in all of OmniSim’s simulated worlds. An example of a necessary truth would be 2 + 2 = 4 or the law of noncontradiction (this law states that for any specified proposition p, it is impossible for both p and not p to be true; e.g. it is impossible for me to exist and to not exist at the same time). Both of these things are true in all possible worlds.
A couple easy-to-understand and often used concepts is negation and “therefore.” I’ll symbolize negation using the tilde: ~.
Not p
Which means “p is not true” and is written as:
~p
“~p” is usually just read as “not p” instead of “p is not true.” The word “therefore” is symbolized with three triangular dots that look like this: ∴
The next symbol I’ll introduce is the horseshoe: ⊃, which signifies a conditional statement. For example,
If p then q
Means:
p ⊃ q
Using the conditional statement, some rules of inference can be gathered. One of them is called Modus Ponens. In English, it states that
If p then q
p
——————
Therefore, q
In symbolic logic:
p ⊃ q
p
——————
∴ q
Another rule is modus tollens and in English it goes like this:
If p then q
Not q
——————
Therefore, not p
And in our artificial language:
p ⊃ q
~q
——————
∴ ~p
Another symbol I’ll be using is called the wedge (also sometimes called “vee”) and it looks like ∨. This signifies “or.”
For example:
p or q
is
p ∨ q
The above says that at least one of the statements (p or q) is true. It can only be false if both p and q are false. As long as at least one of them is true, then “p ∨ q” is true. One rule of logic I’ll be using is called disjunctive syllogism:
p or q
Not p
—————
Therefore, q
And symbolically:
p ∨ q
~p
—————
∴ q.
Sometimes the last two premises are replaced with “~q” and “∴ p.”
Now that you know the symbols, you’ll be able to understand Becker's postulate, which holds that modal status (except for actuality) is always necessary. Hence it asserts []p ⊃ [][]p and <>p ⊃ []<>p. Another rule is what I’ll call “substitution” (I don’t know the official name of the rule):
p ∨ q
q ⊃ r
—————
∴ p ∨ r
Using the definition of God described earlier, let’s label the claim of “God exists” as G. Remember, in this case the theist defines “God” as “the greatest possible being.” The greatest possible being would have the greatest possible existence: necessary existence. So it logically follows (by definition) that If God exists, he does so necessarily.
- G ⊃ []G If God (on the definition above) exists, He exists necessarily.
- ~[]~G This states that G is not impossible, or <>G
These are the premises. The conclusion follows as demonstrated:
- []G ∨ ~ []G Law of Excluded Middle
- ~[]G ⊃ []~[]G Becker’s postulate applied to ~[]p
- []G ∨ []~[]G 3,4 substitution
- []~[]G ⊃ []~G 1, modal modus tollens
- []G ∨ []~G 5,6 substitution
———————————
∴ []p 7,2 disjunctive syllogism
And there you have it. Why does God exist? Because he necessarily exists. That sort of explanation can’t be used with the order of the universe I described. Remember that the universe did not have to have the kind of order it does. If it did, then the order being necessary is itself an adequate explanation. But it didn’t. It could just as easily operate in a way that would be much less harmonious with theism. Why does God exist? Because he has to. This is an acceptable explanation if he necessarily exists.
What about premise #2? When dealing with these sorts of things, we rely on “innocent until proven guilty” on possibility claims. There isn’t a logical rule I know of that makes the existence of God (on the definition above) logically impossible, inconsistent, or incoherent. In addition, God is defined as “the greatest possible being.” It hardly makes sense to claim that it is impossible for something to exist when that something is by definition possible.
>>Another evidential argument on the order of the
>>universe that has become fairly well known in
>>theological circles is the “fine-tuning” of the
>>physical constants. That is, if the physical
>>constants in the universe were altered even slightly,
>>no life could have possibly existed. Like the
>>mathematics thing, the universe doesn’t have to be
>>“fine-tuned” for life. It is logically possible for
>>the universe not to have these “fine-tuned” physical
>>constants. And yet it does.
>
>Yes, and it's logically possible that you might have
>never been born. But you were. So now we have to
>work with what we have. Any time you try to play the
>statistics game with the likelihood for certain huge
>universal things to have happened, I think you get
>onto shaky ground. For all we know, although these
>things seem like "fine tuning" to us, they might be
>just part of the way the universe is.
Well, yes, it is the way that the universe is.
>Sometimes you
>argue against macroevolution because people apply a
>concept that is used on a smaller level to a larger
>level. I would accuse you of the same problem here,
>except the opposite: you apply concepts which would
>work on a small scale (e.g., all the knobs are set to
>the right place for a plane to take off... the odds of
>this happening by accident are small, so some person
>must have set all the knobs to the right place... if
>even one knob had been wrong, the plane couldn't have
>taken off) to the much larger scale of the entire
>universe. I'm not sure these things can be carried
>over to that scale without losing some of their
>effectiveness.
Why? The data exists as it does. Scientific analysis demonstrates of the physical constants demonstrates the how “fine-tuned” they are.
>>Is it very rational to
>>believe that our universe just happens to have
>>precisely the right constants, to simply say, “That’s
>>just the way it is”? That sort of belief strikes me
>>as having terribly impotent explanatory power compared
>>to the theory of a rationally orderly God creating the
>>universe.
>
>It's interesting that you feel that coming up with an
>invisible being to explain things has much better
>explanatory power than anything else.
It’s interesting that you feel coming up with an invisible process (macroevolution) has much better explanatory power than anything else.
>Remember that
>Ptolemy had an elaborate explanation for the apparent
>retrograde motion of the planets. His explanation fit
>the data very nicely, but it was completely wrong.
>Now, if you were Ptolemy, and I were... well... me,
>you would be talking about how wonderful epicycles
>are, and I would be saying, "Well, I disagree with
>you." You would, of course, say, "Well, how do you
>explain it then?" To which I would answer, "Well, I'm
>not sure. I don't have enough data to decide, but I
>definitely find your explanation untenable." Simply
>coming up with a theory that matches the data is easy,
>but don't expect me to accept it or even say it has
>more explanatory power than anything else if I don't
>find it compelling.
Very well, than I’ll reject macroevolution because I find the explanation untenable.
What I’m trying to demonstrate here with the “macroevolution” thing is that you need to do a bit more to explain yourself. I could easily apply these things (“that’s just the way it is” for the data that evolution explains, “I don’t know, but I find macroevolution untenable” etc.) to macroevolution. I suspect what this comes down to is inherent implausibility.
>I think we simply don't know
>enough about the universe on a fundamental level to
>have any real understanding of what goes on "behind
>the scenes."
We know enough to know the data that we have, such as the highly sophisticated mathematical patterns in which the universe consistently operates, the fine-tuning of the physical constants for life etc.
>>>>>I do not think it is fair for you to assume that
>>>>>people know what you mean by the word "atheist".
>>>>
>>>>I thought the standard dictionary definition would
>>>>suffice in the context of these circumstances. If not
>>>>I apologize. I hope I have made myself clear in this
>>>>post.
>>>
>>>Yes, but your "standard dictionary definition" is not
>>>the one you offered to me before. The standard
>>>definition is "Someone who does not believe in God,"
>>>and the context of my quote was that you were
>>>discussing "classical atheism."
>>
>>I think it was clear that I was referring to
>>“classical atheism” in that paragraph you’re referring
>>to, mainly because I explicitly stated the term
>>“classical atheism” this post. In the other contexts (e.g. the order of
>>the universe) I’m using a more “standard definition.”
>
>I don't want to get into this much more, but the
>discussion went like this:
>
>1) you said theism explains the orderliness of the
>universe better than atheism
>2) I asked why
>3) you said classical atheism states that the universe
>should be non-orderly
That’s not quite how it happened. You asked, “show us what kind of universe could exist that atheism would better explain” and I used classical atheism and a certain set of data that could possibly exist as an example of how atheism could better explain something better than theism.
>4) I said I didn't know we were talking about
>"classical atheism," and explained that the word
>"atheism" simply means that a person doesn't have a
>belief in a deity. It makes no assertions about the
>orderliness of the universe. Then I said I didn't
>think it was fair for you to think that when you said
>"atheism," people would know you meant "classical
>atheism." (this is where we pick up in the first
>quote listed above)
>5) You said (see above) that you thought the
>dictionary definition would suffice in these
>circumstances
I also said that “classical atheism” was just an example of atheism that could explain a certain set of data better than atheism. The “dictionary definition” I used in other circumstances. The exception of the dictionary definition was “classical atheism,” and if you did not know that I was referring to “classical atheism” when I said “classical atheism,” I apologize, but I think it was fairly clear. If you confused classical atheism with what I meant as “atheism,” in other contexts that I used the word in, I apologize if I did not make myself sufficiently clear.
>6) I said of course, but the "standard dictionary
>definition" does not include the points you made using
>"classical atheism"
>7) You said you thought it was clear that you were
>referring to "classical atheism."
>
>Go back to the beginning (number 1 here). Your quote
>that you have used several times on this board is that
>theism explains the orderliness of the universe better
>than atheism. You make no mention of "classical
>atheism" in this quote
Perhaps not, but this is irrelevant to the context in which I used it. Atheism by itself (not necessarily classical atheism) can only seem explain the order (that I described) by saying, “that’s just the way it is.” The “classical atheism” thing was used as an example of how atheism could explain certain data better than atheism (albeit a specific form of atheism).
>>>By that same token, I
>>>can think that nature just _does_ operate in
>>>mathematical patterns. Maybe there is no "why" about
>>>it.
>>
>>Such an idea is precisely the problem. To illustrate
>>I’ll use an example. Evolution is an explanatory
>>theory. That is, it explains why certain data exist.
>>Suppose you adduce lots of empirical evidence that
>>evolution explains (fossil sequencing, certain
>>similarities between life forms, etc.) and suppose I
>>say that evolution is wrong. My explanation? “That’s
>>just the way it is,” and there is no “why” about the
>>data you showed me. Would you be skeptical? I feel
>>the same sort of skepticism with the notion that there
>>is no “why” about the data I presented, at least in
>>part because of the explanatory power factor.
>
>I listed my reasons for this above. Basically, any
>theory (as you always say) can be offered to explain
>any data. So your theory is that God created things,
>and the orderliness of the universe (which you seem to
>say just means that the same actions produce the same
>events over and over again) supports this theory. Big
>deal. The evolutionary theory is a comprehensive
>theory that has been tested and involves all the major
>sciences. It has been proven over and over again.
Theories cannot be proven, and yes I know your using the term “proven” loosely. But we must understand what evolution is: an explanatory theory. It explains why certain data exist. Theism explains why certain data exist as well. Theism is comprehensive in that it involves nearly all major sciences because of its support for several necessary principles (including the uniformity of nature). For your, “it [evolution] has been proven over and over again” I can just say that it is not proven at all, and the data evolution explains is a brute fact or in other words, “that’s the way it is.” Or I could claim that my “black force” theory explains the data and is just as good as evolution (this “black force” causes similarities in life forms etc. in the universe. This force is not Darwin’s theory, but it causes these sorts of things to happen all over the place) unless you can offer more reasons why these sorts of explanations apply only to theism.
>Sure, your belief that there
>was a creator goes along with the data, but I could
>create a theory that says that there is "black force,"
>and this force causes orderliness in the universe.
>This force is not intelligent, but it has been around
>forever and causes orderliness all over the place. My
>theory works well, but do you accept it? Is it
>suddenly more rational than just saying, "I don't
>know" simply because it explains the data?
>…<
>Tell me other things about your "creator" theory which
>fit the data better than any other theory. Again, my
>"black force" theory is just as good as your "creator"
>theory so far, unless you can offer more reasons why
>yours explains the data better.
This sort of thing goes back to the underdetermination of theories. Yes, there will always be innumerable ridiculous theories that can accommodate any set of data. I could just as easily apply the “black force” or “invisible unicorn” or “magic leprechaun” as the causal agent for any set of data, including that which evolution explains. Why is macroevolution better than “magic leprechaun” for the data? Why is the wind a better explanation for “invisible unicorn” for its data?
>…the orderliness of the universe (which you seem to
>say just means that the same actions produce the same
>events over and over again
>…<
>Now I see that what you mean by "orderly"
>is that the same actions produce the same events. In
>other words, we can predict things.
That’s not quite what I meant. Yes, “order” does include the uniformity of nature (in the sense that science’s physical laws depend upon, not in a way that would defy quantum mechanics) but it also includes the highly sophisticated patterns that our universe consistently operates in, the fine-tuned physical constants, and so forth. It was and is obvious that the world operates consistently in some ways (e.g. what goes up comes down again and again), but who knew that there was so much more to the world than this? Who knew that there was a more complex level of order (mathematical patterns etc.) to be learned in addition to mere obvious consistency of certain everyday things? (An example: mathematical patterns were found in the rate at which an object falls, even though the simple existence of something falling was quite obvious beforehand.) The theists expected it, and it’s one of the reasons we now have modern science.
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