Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 06/10/05 1:08pm
In reply to:
Damoclese
's message, "Windows Happens" on 06/ 9/05 7:22pm
>>Not so, for a
>>number of reasons. One, even though we know little
>>about the designer, modern ID can still make
>>empirically testable and falsifiable predictions, as I
>>explained earlier.
>
>Not really. It can make some inferences, but the sorts
>of things you qualify as "falsifiable predictions"
>build from a host of assumptions about the designer.
Perhaps so (though I can only think of a very few). The theory implicitly assumes, for instance, that the designer designed life in such a way to be empirically testable when it says, "artificial intervention is necessary" for the creation of life on Earth. Nonetheless, that still doesn't change the fact that this theory yields empirically testable and falsifiable predictions.
Any empirically testable theory includes (at least implicitly) some background assumptions to make predictions. ID is hardly unique, and should not be rejected on that basis.
>>Think of the robots on Pluto
>>example. Does the fact that we don't have a clue
>>about the designer means we should pretend that ID
>>isn't the most rational explanation? Obviously not.
>
>Answering your own questions is certainly handy, but
>the simple answer to this question is YES.
So the fact that the currents of nature are evidently not reasonably capable of producing the robots is just an immaterial, irrelevant fact? We should say, "Well, we don't know much about the designer, so let's all pretend these robots weren't designed"?
Would you have a better explanation how the robots got there? (Remember the game of inference to the best explanation.)
>>Why is it applicable for abiogenesis -> designer? ID
>>bases its arguments on what we do know about the kind
>>of life we see on Earth.
>
>Actually, it bases its arguments on interpreted
>humanistic criteria of desgin which are subjective and
>shaky at best.
Not at all. Look, if naturalistic causes are not reasonably capable of doing the job, why wouldn't it be rational to accept design? The basic logic seems hard to argue with. (Think back to the magician example, something you have evaded.)
>>We know what life is made
>>of, and we can examine the problems and barriers
>>thereof (e.g. getting functional proteins, RNA, and
>>DNA via undirected chemical reactions) or (should ID
>>be empirically falsified) ways to get life via
>>undirected chemical reactions. This sort of thing
>>allows ID to make testable and falsifiable empirical
>>predictions.
>
>We know we can emulate however life got here. That's
>not really all that reassuring that it was designed.
Need I remind you that the methods we use to create functional proteins, RNA and DNA could not have been used by abiogenesis? Nature can't reasonably emulate those methods of human scientists.
What is reassuring that it was designed is (1)the predicted lack of any known means for undirected chemical reactions to get life (2) the predicted serious problems and barriers for undirected chemical reactions to get life (3) a known means (more than abiogenesis, anyway) for ID to create life. The (3) will undoubtedly reach full measure as technology goes on.
>>And of course, none of what you said even addresses
>>the problems of abiogenesis (an example of which you
>>seemed to have ignored)
>
>I don't ignore the problems of abiogenesis
You have so far.
>I simply
>acknowledge that there is a dearth of knowledge
>concerning many pieces of abiogenesis.
That's an understatement. You didn't address, for instance, my claim that ID explains the data better. ID argues from what we do know about mathematical probability and observed chemistry, whereas abiogenesis here is arguing from laws we don't know about and haven't observed. This is a big reason why I believe ID explains the data better in this instance. There doesn’t seem to be any good reason to think otherwise (except perhaps that one may not like ID for philosophical reasons).
>>My claim, “It is rational to believe belief X if it is
>>highly probable that belief X is true.” Why is this
>>statement false? You haven’t, for instance, given a
>>counterexample or possible scenario in which the
>>antecedent is true but the consequent is false.
>
>No, but I did show that rationality and probability
>are not necessarily one in the same
No you didn't, at least you never responded to my last counterexample argument.
>because the
>outcome no matter what the probability determines
>rationality.
Outcomes, as I illustrated, is one of the things that determine probability. (Remember, I'm using probability in a more accurate mathematical sense, so that it is inclusive of all probabilities from 0 to 1.) You say that rationality and probability are not necessarily one and the same. I claim that the statement, “It is rational to believe belief X if it is highly probable that belief X is true” is necessarily true. If you think I'm wrong, and want to actually show that it's wrong, please given a possible scenario, a counterexample.
>>Nor does what you said refute my criticisms of your
>>(purely, it seems) philosophical objections against
>>ID. For instance,
>
>ID is categorically in a philosophical position
Really? ID is often a very scientific position as in SETI and forensic science. It basis its claims (as in the case of life on Earth) on empirical data, mathematical probability etc. Tossing out the theory just because you personally don't like it isn't enough reason to discard the theory. And in any case, my point above was the same: none of what you said (at that time) addressed my criticisms of your philosophical positions.
>>Nor of course does what you said refute my claims
>>about ID being empirically falsifiable etc. (whereas
>>abiogenesis does not seem anywhere near as
>>falsifiable). Nor does it address what I said about
>>your imaginary law:
>
>Science does not progress based on how falsifiable a
>theory is.
No, but the more empirically falsifiable the theory is, the better. Modern ID is certainly much more empirically falsifiable than abiogenesis; it has that advantage over its competitor at least.
>>Note again that ID argues from what we do know
>>about mathematical probability and observed chemistry,
>>whereas abiogenesis here is arguing from laws we
>>don't know about and haven't observed.
>
>I don't really see where this is an advantage quite
>honestly.
Here's one: remember what you were saying about an argument from ignorance? That's a bad thing, right? Or does it stop being a bad thing when it starts to apply to your favorite theories?
ID has a much stronger connection to empirical data etc. All else held constant, we accept theories that have a strong connection with the evidence, what we do know, over theories that do not. ID basis its claims (at least in this case) on actual evidence (e.g. empirical), abiogenesis does not. All else held constant, I prefer theories that are based on evidence. Why don’t you see evidential basis as advantageous?
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