Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 06/11/05 10:24pm
In reply to:
Damoclese
's message, "I think I shall never see" on 06/11/05 9:31am
>>And what nature reasonably can't. There are some
>>things that nature cannot reasonably produce but
>>humans (granted, the only known intelligent life) can.
>
>Although we really aren't sure of what nature can and
>cannot produce since we've only been around for a
>smidgen of the time that nature has.
Scientific theories are never proven, so that really isn't much of an issue. We can be reasonably confident that nature can't reasonably produce robots, trains, planes, and automobiles; even though we can't rigorously prove it.
>>To some extent, yes. If X had a beginning, and if the
>>currents of nature are not reasonably capable of
>>creating X,
>
>Exactly how do you know what the "currents of nature"
>are capable of producing?
We examine the currents of nature.
>>even if it cannot have been human
>>intervention and even if the designer has tastes that
>>are radically different from our own.
>
>Which would be fine except that 1) we don't know what
>the currents of nature can produce over especially
>long amounts of time and 2) We wouldn't be able to
>detect design if it wasn't like our own because we'd
>have no means of comparison.
(2) is irrelevant. Think about it. Suppose (1) didn't apply; archaeologists find the Rosetta Stone and say, "Well, this could be human-made but we'll never know, because nature could produce something like this too." No, they don't say that because it is overwhelmingly acknowledged that nature isn't reasonably capable of making something like the Rosetta Stone.
>>So, ID assumes that the designer
>>constructed life in such a way that naturalistic
>>causes are insufficient in producing.
>
>And how we detect that is a mystery.
Not at all. We detect it by examining the data, seeing if ID's empirical predictions come true etc.
>>You may not
>>like that assumption, but it’s at least empirically
>>testable and falsifiable.
>
>It isn't until ID can outline some way in which we can
>say something was designed and also some way to show
>what nature can and cannot produce over long periods
>of time.
Known mathematics, known chemistry etc. It'll never be rigorous proof, but it is evidence. And the assumption is falsifiable. This you cannot deny. In contrast, abiogenesis doesn't seem anywhere near as falsifiable; your constant arguments based on ignorance are evidence of this.
>>It’s certainly more
>>falsifiable than abiogenesis (you may disagree, but
>>then please come up with a conceivable laboratory
>>experiment that would falsify abiogenesis).
>
>Here's one: If the Miller experiment had shown that it
>wasn't possible to get proteins from inert matter,
>then abiogenesis would have been in grave trouble.
Easy to say it with words, but what kind of experiment could show that it wasn't possible? The appeal to laws we've never seen etc. seems to forever save the theory from anything we've discovered about what we currently know about nature. Already I've appealed to known chemistry and mathematical probability and you've done precisely that.
>>But you also seem to be saying the
>>"Well...let's all pretend these robots weren't
>>designed" given the circumstances
>
>No, if anything I'm saying that while design may be
>the explanation that one would lean towards one would
>be well advised NOT to go jumping to any conclusions
I see, so inferring that--after careful examination--the robots were artificially created would be "jumping to a conclusion." How about a perfect replica of a 1979 Oldsmobile found on Pluto? I suppose inferring design--even after careful examination to confirm that it is indeed identical--would be "jumping to a conclusion" as well?
>>An animal's explosive diarrhea does not seem like a
>>plausible explanation for creating robots.
>>Intelligent design appears to be much more reasonable.
>
>If you mean it seems to make intuitively more sense to
>you, then fine. However, that doesn't make it more
>reasonable.
Nonetheless, ID is far more reasonable in this instance.
>>Not at all. If an alien designed something that
>>naturalistic causes are not reasonably capable of
>>doing,
>
>Which we would know how?
Again, by examining the currents of nature.
>>it would still be rational to accept design.
>>What species the intelligent agent is has no
>relevance.
>
>It's quite relevant since we only know of our own
>designs.
(1) It's irrelevant if nature can't reasonably produce it. (2) Suppose we design life. Then we'll now about it. What then?
Or suppose it’s the 17th century and we find a replica of a 1979 Oldsmobile. It isn’t of our design (yet) because we don’t have the ability to make it. The twentieth century comes around, and we can make automobiles. Was it rational to infer design in the 17th century? Does it become rational in the twentieth century? Similarly, suppose we design life in the 22nd century? Will ID become rational then?
>>In short, the basic reasoning of ID has nothing to do
>>about the designer being sufficiently close to humans.
>
>Oh no? Then how is it we are to detect design? By the
>currents of nature?
Yes.
>We don't have any clue about the
>currents of nature on other planets
We can assume they follow the laws of known chemistry!
>and don't have
>much of a clue about the currents of nature on our own
>planet.
That's not true at all (e.g. the laws of chemistry and physics).
>> It has to do with examining the capabilities of
>>nature (arguing from known chemistry and mathematical
>>probability etc.).
>
>Although we don't really know what the capabilities of
>nature are.
Yep, and all that work scientists have been doing on that has failed miserably.
I don't think so.
>>Well, my point was that these scientists were
>>not emulating how abiogenesis could have
>>supposedly produced them (which was quite pertinent
>>given what I was responding to).
>
>Abiogensis probably didn't use machines to generate
>the given outcome, but it could have very well used
>the basic concepts in some other way.
It's very easy to claim that with words, but by all means, rigorously justify your position and submit it to a peer-reviewed scientific journal.
>I noticed you
>didn't answer my question about there being only one
>possible way to make proteins, so I'll ask again: Do
>you really think there is only ONE way to make
>proteins?
No.
>>ID has a known
>>possible mechanism (for functional proteins, RNA and
>>DNA etc.), abiogenesis does not.
>
>Having a known possible mechanism isn't a big help
>when one of your major assumptions is wobbly.
The assumption that we know enough about the currents of nature to make a reasonable judgment? I don't think that assumption is as wobbly as you say.
>>Again, ID is arguing from what we do know about
>>observed chemistry, mathematical probability etc.
>
>Actually, it isn't.
Yes it is. Pretending it isn't doesn't make it true. I have given you known facts of chemistry and mathematical probability as basis for a particular claim. Appeal to ignorance all you want, but I appealed to known chemistry and mathematical probability.
>>Having a known mechanism to work with is better than
>>not having one.
>
>Not really, particularly not when the mechanism you
>have is rather unlikely due to complication.
Oh? And what complication makes the mechanism unlikely?
Back to my claim,
“It is rational to believe belief X if it is highly probable that belief X is true” is necessarily true.
You claimed I was clearly wrong. I replied:
>>By all means, please give me some shred of evidence
>>that I am "clearly" wrong.
>
>If I give you direct evidence by observation
>(empirical evidence) that people do not believe things
>are rational which do not happen, you reject it and
>demand a "shred of evidence".
That's because it isn't evidence.
>>That's not enough. People don't always behave
>>rationally, so pointing out that some people don't
>>always believe X even if X is highly probably true is
>>not a good argument.
>
>I'm not pointing out that they don't always believe X.
>I'm pointing out that if something other than X
>happens, if they don't then accept that other X, then
>they aren't being rational.
If something other than X happens, X is no longer highly probably true and thus your argument establishes nothing. (All of this was mentioned before.)
Once again, I ask for some shred of evidence that I am "clearly" wrong.
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