Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 03/13/04 2:08pm
In reply to:
Baz
's message, "Deduction" on 03/12/04 4:22pm
>http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/index.html?http:/
>/www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Irrational_Deduction.ht
>ml
>
>Philosopher's Deduction Fallacy
>The Philosopher's Deduction Fallacy is the name I've
>given to the problem with philosophers. If anyone
>wonders why the ravings of philosophers seem so
>pointless and irrational, it is due almost entirely to
>this single fallacy. The fallacy is the belief that
>Knowledge cannot be certain unless it is derived
>exclusively from Deduction.
Hmm, sounds like a rationalist view of epistemology. It's not held by all philosophers.
>The word 'prove' has two meanings. The first meaning
>is to derive from the rules of Logic. This is the
>meaning that philosopher's tend to utilize, ignoring
>almost entirely the second meaning.
I don't think they ignore it so much as they don't think it's in the "same league" as hardcore proofs like mathematics and other uses of logic.
>The second meaning
>is to show evidence of. If little Jimmy and Freddy are
>playing one day, and Jimmy tells Freddy that he can
>run faster than him, Freddy will say "Prove it!". It
>would be surprising if Jimmy showed a mathematical
>formula, or other such deductive method. Instead, he
>races Freddy.
Jimmy could perhaps show reasonable and credible evidence, but it's not really a "proof."
>Philosophers, on the other hand, go through elaborate
>mental acrobatics to try to convince you that the
>world before you is real. Often, they give it up as
>impossible, and then wrongly conclude that the world
>isn't real. Or more likely, they say that "We can't be
>sure if the world around us is real". Why? Because
>they accept the idea that to really know something for
>sure, it needs to be a product of deduction.
I don't think these sorts of philosophers are that far off, even though they are likely mistaken to some extent. For instance, what evidence do you have that your memory is ever reliable? You probably can't do it without using circular reasoning. This can lead to skepticism, in part by using an unreasonably high standard of proof to accept certain beliefs.
>The first question, of course, is what knowledge they
>are using to deduce. Deduction requires some initial
>knowledge.
That knowledge is usually logic, at least as it pertains to things like valid inferential forms.
>We say that Socrates is a man, and all men
>are mortal. We then deduce that Socrates is mortal.
>But where do we get the knowledge that Socrates is a
>man? Or that all men are mortal?
These kinds of examples are just to show valid inferential forms. To be fair, in many cases you do need justification for the premises if it is to be accepted as sound.
>Sometimes you can
>step farther back and derive one of those statements
>with deduction as well. But eventually, there needs to
>be knowledge that isn't gained deductively.
Methinks that to be true.
>This is the crux of the problem for philosophers. Only
>Induction can give them the roots they need to deduce.
>Induction, though, is considered unreliable, since it
>is not "provable".
Alas, it is true that inductive reasoning isn't as ironclad as deductive reasoning. I can see how some would be suspicious of it or at least not hold it as high in esteem as deductive reasoning.
>So philosophers talk about A
>Priori. knowledge. The most important piece of a
>priori knowledge they insist on is the rules of logic.
>In order for one to use deduction, one must have
>knowledge of the rules of logic. How does one gain
>knowledge of it? The answer is through induction.
Well, I have to disagree with that. I think that some laws of logic, like the law of noncontradiction, are just "self-evident." You assume logic is reliable because of that self-evident nature.
>The games continue, but because they cannot accept
>induction, they have to create a philosophical system
>that does not depend on it. Which means that it does
>not depend on reality. And the result is that it does
>not correspond to reality either.
Who is "they"? Philosophers? I think there's some over-generalizing here. And reality does necessarily conform to the laws of logic, so I don't think that last sentence is quite accurate.
>Although the loop is
>bigger than normal, the result is an attempt to use
>circular reasoning.
Depends on what structure and the specific justification method is used.
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