| Subject: OPERATION STRANDFEST 2 |
Author:
Johan Ryheul
|
[
Next Thread |
Previous Thread |
Next Message |
Previous Message
]
Date Posted: 11:49:47 07/10/05 Sun
In reply to:
Johan Ryheul
's message, "OPERATION STRANDFEST" on 11:48:43 07/10/05 Sun
The actual Operation Strandfest happened on the 10th of July 1917. That day it was dry but stormy weather.
At 6 AM the first batteries started opening fire on the British lines.
At 10 A.M. FA 231, I and II Marine Feldflieger Abteilung attacked British lines and destroyed the bridges over the Yser river. Due to the weather conditions the planned gun support from the destroyers and torpedo boats of the Flandern Flottille had to be cancelled.
With the bridges over the Yser destroyed, there was no possibility for reinforcements, and even more the roads leading towards the front were also under gunfire. The British had directly the fear that something was going to happen and were bringing reinforcements with trucks and lorries from Dunkirk, but this was to late.
At 19.51 hrs the attack follows by the naval infantry of the III Marine Division, supported by planes.
It took the first German wave only two minutes to take the first British line ! Some reports even still talk about the Seesoldaten taking the lines, although this was a referral to the Seebataillone, which officially stopped to exist by the end of 1914. Surprised by their luck they stormed directly the second line, took it in a mather of no time and the third was taken in hand grenade battle. It seems the German artillery had a hard time following the fast attack (in other words, probably some marine personnel died by friendly fire).
Flamethrowers were used to destroy the last British defenses in the dug outs etc.
However more to the east, the naval infantry was not that lucky, but again German reports tell us that the goals that had to be reached were taken by 21.00 hours.
According to German sources 1300 POW's were taken, of which 17 officers including the Regimental CO. . The British opponents were the 1 Northamptonshire and 2 KRRC of 2nd Brigade, 1st Division.
According to Robert Dunlop the total British casualties amounted to approximately 3,126 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. Of these, fifty officers and 1,253 other ranks belonged to the two battalions of 1st Division. He also mentions that 4 officers and 64 other ranks managed to reach the west bank of the Yser. It is not clear at all how high the German casualties were, but fact is that it was not a big number, which is also supported by the small number of graves that can be found that date of the 10th of July 1917 on the German military cemeteries in Flanders.
In the most easterly sector of the attack there still was a British counterattack which were able to retake the 250 meters of ground they had lost in that area, but this was without any importance to the Germans, which had reached their goals more to the west, and would keep them till the retreat in October 1918.
A report said that the observer planes and also the Kampfgeschwader with Rittmeister von Richthofen, had played an important role in the action.
The POW 's were taken to Oostende and Brugge, where there was a parade for Admiral von Schröder.
One of the participants in the operation Strandfest and a Lt. in the future Marine Sturmabteilung was a certain Bernard Hermann Ramcke, which certainly is known as the famous WW II Fallschirmjäger General.
This is what generally can be found on the matter… concerning the aviation.
If one’s lucky this is what may be found more on the operation, concerning the aerial part :
The III Marine Infanterie Division attacks, supported by planes. The western bank of the Yser is bombarded by 24 C type planes, and a plane from II MFFA co-ordinates the battle from the sky with it’s wireless, meanwhile two Schusta 29 planes protect the plane.
KG I planes bombarded coastal line between Nieuwpoort and Oostduinkerke. Jasta 17 planes do air cover for the whole operation during which a Sopwith is shot down.
During my visit this year in May at the Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv at Munchen, Reinhard Kastner pointed me towards a most interesting source on the aviation part of this attack. These reports were sent to Kofl 6 by Kofl 4 and Kofl Marinekorps. It gave in detail what happened day to day before and on the of the Strandfest. This text is the result from the translation.
The following units participated : I, II MFFA – FA A 293b, A 231, 48b - Schusta's 1, 16, 29, Marine Jasta, Jasta's 7, 8, 17, 20, Kasta 23 + the 4 elite fighter units of Jagdgeschwader I and the 6 Kasta's of Kampfgeschwader I, saying that the unit left it's airfield at Ascq for it to go to Gistel.
Most of the reports are from the hand of Kap.lt. Alfred Ritscher, who was the Kommandeur of the Feldflieger Abteilungen of the Marinekorps Flandern.
Ritscher issued a very clear order for the crews before and during the operation, and if necessary after it, the first days.
No cards, notices or orders were to be taken along in the plane. If taken prisoner there was not to be said a word about the operation, even when in prison, because of the danger of the enemy, listening to conversations among prisoners.
The plane was to be burned if forced to land in enemy territory, and for this purpose a special device was build in to the planes.
All participating units had to place an experienced observer by the telephone as Officer with duty.
No planes were to take off from an airfield unless they were on the schedule made by Ritscher, otherwise they needed an ok from Ritscher. Every loss of personnel or material, or personnel not able to operate, planes with engine trouble or other were immediately te be reported to Ritscher. The crews were also told to take enough negatives, maps without positions, signaling and machinegun ammo, etc with them.
In the preparations of the operation can be found that during the Strandfest and the days after a Jagdstaffel was flying ‘Sperrzeit’ while another one was in ‘Bereitschaft’. The last unit was to be in the air within 20 minutes after the command was given of heavy enemy activity that could endanger the operation. Meanwhile the Jagdgeschwader Richthofen was kept in reserve and could be used every of these days from 08.00 hours. Refueling and reserve airfield for this unt were the aerodromes Snellegem and Varsenare (in fact the northern and eastern side of the Jabbeke aerodrome). Between 5 and 6.30 Jasta 20 was on duty with the Marine Jasta in reserve. 6.30 till 8.00 was for Jasta 17 and Jasta 7 in reserve. 8.00 till 9.30 the Marine Jasta and Jasta 8. 9.30 till 11.00 Jasta 7 and Jasta 20. 11.00 till 12.30 Jasta 8 and Jasta 17. 12.30 till 14.00 Jasta 20 and Marine Jasta. 14.00 till 15.30 Jasta 17 and Jasta 7 as reserve. 15.30 till 17.00 Marine Jasta and Jasta 8. 17.00 till 18.30 Jasta 7 and Jasta 20. 18.30 till 20.00 Jasta 8 and Jasta 17. 20.00 till 21.30 Jasta 20, no reserve. 21.30 till darkness Marine Jasta, no reserve.
Kasta 23 bombed the station of Adinkerke in the night of the 8th on the 9th of July.
Kagohl I was moved from Ascq to Gistel aerodrome on the 7th of July. The unit was to operate from the night before the operation and to bomb railway stations, aerodromes and fortified positions behind the frontlines. They also were to bomb Dunkirk in the night before, but this had to be cancelled because of low clouds.
During the days before the attack, observation planes were recording all enemy traffic on the roads and railways towards the sector.
[
Next Thread |
Previous Thread |
Next Message |
Previous Message
]
| |
Feedback: 