VoyForums
[ Show ]
Support VoyForums
[ Shrink ]
VoyForums Announcement: Programming and providing support for this service has been a labor of love since 1997. We are one of the few services online who values our users' privacy, and have never sold your information. We have even fought hard to defend your privacy in legal cases; however, we've done it with almost no financial support -- paying out of pocket to continue providing the service. Due to the issues imposed on us by advertisers, we also stopped hosting most ads on the forums many years ago. We hope you appreciate our efforts.

Show your support by donating any amount. (Note: We are still technically a for-profit company, so your contribution is not tax-deductible.) PayPal Acct: Feedback:

Donate to VoyForums (PayPal):

[ Login ] [ Main index ] [ Post a new message ] [ Search | Check update time | Archives: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, [9], 10 ]

[ Next Thread | Previous Thread | Next Message | Previous Message ]

Date Posted: 07:38:09 10/31/05 Mon
Author: Celebaelin
Subject: Lee
In reply to: manwitch 's message, "Not entirley fair" on 05:16:20 10/31/05 Mon

I thought that'd get your attention. More of Lee later, first let me do more of my "We're not worthy" bit to Wellington. This is a map of the deployment at Waterloo

http://www.napoleonguide.com/maps_hmwater1.htm

Unfortunately you can't expand it to look in detail but just from this view you can pretty much see what Napoleons plan was. Surprise surprise he's going to march up the center again and trust to his troops morale to carry the attack home. Wellington had had the site of the battle chosen a full year in advance allegedly, although their were no specialist fortifications constructed his 'dogleg' deployment (refusing the right flank) follows the terrain and covers the road(s) to Brussels, which was Napoleon's objective. This map is a bit simpler than some I have seen but it does show the diffuse positioning of the British and Allied forces behind the ridge to minimise the effect of artillery fire on all but the Poor Bloody Infantry who necessarily had to occupy to front line on the ridge itself. There is nothing in the least bit 'telegraphed' about Wellingtons plan here, even the limited cavalry support to the right flank (the dogleg) can be quickly beefed up as the bulk of the cavalry are close to the angle in the line. In short it's versatile and strong defensively, Wellington is more or less guaranteed of not being outflanked on his right because of his extended deployment and on the left the terrain is difficult (slow going) AND this is the direction Blucher will be coming from in the late afternoon (his vanguard attacked through the village on Napoleon's right flank, not a great idea actually but a convenient point of reference). I'm beginning to understand Wellington as this map shows him but as I say I've seen more complex versions which are, quite frankly, mystifying to me so far. Versatility gone crazy-ape bonkers, what the...? What he had in mind if those are accurate I've absolutely no idea, but then again the positions are very diffuse.

What do mean Napoleon didn't have any air cover? He had all those eagles with him didn't he? Wellington had a fair few Sams of course. If Napoleon could have used Montgolfier-style baloons he would have, have no doubt. In fact I believe he did use them as observation platforms from time to time.

And so to Lee, I've just had a quick look for deployments for Fredericksburg and Chacellorsville which are the two great victories I'm aware of

http://www.randomhouse.com/features/godsgenerals/fredbattlemap.html

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/map_item.pl?data=/home/www/data/gmd/gmdvhs/gvhs/gvhs01/vhs00132.jp2&style=gmd&itemLink=D?gmd:1:./temp/~ammem_PZzp::&title=Map%20shewing%20[sic]%20advance%20of%206th%20Army%20Corps%20(Genl.%20John%20Sedgwick%20U.S.A.)%20to%20assist%20Gen.%20Hooker%20at%20Chancellorsville.

The maps aren't great but they're the best ones I could find.

Fredericksburg, if I understand it, was manipulated by Lee as Burnside could not afford to cross the river elsewhere having been told to engage the Confederates and drive them back essentially. Abandoning that position to cross elsewhere would have meant offering Lee a free river crossing on his journey North. Ouch! An opposed river crossing against prepared positions. Not much chance without...well, not much chance at all really (ours not to reason why etc). On the other hand this was a fine example of out-manouvering the enemy and forcing him to fight at a dissadvantage (I believe Lee had first met his wife in Fredericksburg? Or was that Jackson? Lee I think). The deployment is sound.

Chancellorsville is rather unusual, the victory was achieved primarily by units clandestinely advancing on the Union camp wasn't it. From the map it is difficult to tell who has got behind whose lines but the story of the battle seems clear in that it was a great Confederate attacking victory won with numerically inferior forces. LOTS of Brownie points for that one in the 'Greatest General of the ACW' table.

Gettysburg

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/national_parks/gett_batt95.jpg

Aha! I need to know what cavalry forces Lee had at his disposal and when Kilpatricks cavalry arrived. Tentatively I'd suggest that delaying Sedgwick's arrival on the 2nd day could have been achieved and might have been critical.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/chatstu.htm

This is useful, it's all Stuart's fault apparently (wagons!). Either that or Ewell and Lee's.

http://www.sedgwick.org/na/families/robert1613/B/2/9/2/GeneralsOfGettysburg-Sedgwick.html

Apparently the 6th Corps were a kind of 'body bank' for the action at Gettysburg and although the 23,000 man strong force might have been difficult to delay the 34 mile march implies to me that something could have been done about preventing or delaying their arrival. I don't know if Kilpatrick was associated with the 6th Corps at all but keeping them out of the battle, even at risk/certainty of defeat in a satellite action would have been desirable it seems to me. The feasability of this I'm unsure of but apparently units were brought into Gettysburg on both sides over 3 days so one assumes some contingent could have been directed to prevent re-enforcements reaching the Fedaral left; Jones or Imboden perhaps?

Many people will have heard the folowing story before but how many knew that it was about Sedgwick?

Sedgwick retained command when the five Union corps were reduced to three in March 1864. On May 9, 1864, while placing his artillery at Spotsylvania, he was hit by a sharpshooter's bullet just under the left eye and killed instantly, just after telling his gunners "They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance."

It's embarrasing but military incompetence was historically often a reason for appointing a commander rather than a block to doing so, and if you don't know what the effective range of your opponants rifles are that's really not a good sign. The weapon responsible was one of the hexagonal bore Whitworth rifles with extended range and accuracy so there is some excuse but still...

Ultimately what defines a great general? Well, not losing any battles goes a long way. Gettysburg was less of a set-piece it seems but IT SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN SO for either side really. It just kinda happened is not a great excuse to offer the wounded and dying.

[ Next Thread | Previous Thread | Next Message | Previous Message ]

Replies:

Forum timezone: GMT-8
VF Version: 3.00b, ConfDB:
Before posting please read our privacy policy.
VoyForums(tm) is a Free Service from Voyager Info-Systems.
Copyright © 1998-2019 Voyager Info-Systems. All Rights Reserved.