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| 19/04/26 8:00:05 | [ Login ] [ Contact Forum Admin ] [ Main index ] [ Post a new message ] [ Search | Check update time | Archives: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, [6], 7, 8 ] |
| Subject: terrorist | |
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Author: October 6, 1976 |
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Date Posted: 14/06/06 19:51:48 In reply to: Boa-Morte 's message, "Em Cuba a morte foi irradicada!" on 14/06/06 17:08:51 When the terrorist attack against the Cubana Airlines DC-8 took place on October 6, 1976, was Luis Posada Carriles [one of the two accused masterminds] a CIA agent or not? This is key to the case because if Posada Carriles was an agent at that time then it would be impossible for the US government to say that it had nothing to do with the terrorist crime that killed 73 innocent persons when the aircraft blew up off the coast of Barbados. The CIA says in its official response that it had broken its ties with Posada in February, 1976. And, why did they supposedly severe the ties? One might think that it was because Posada was a poorly performing agent, according to the parameters of the Central Intelligence Agency. But that is not what some declassified CIA and FBI documents say. Those documents, according to a series of articles in The New York Times in July 1998, could be seen in the following light: During the decade of the 1970s, the House of Representative Select Committee on Assassinations was investigating several political assassinations, among them that of President John F. Kennedy. By means of a Congressional mandate, that Committee's investigators obtained access to a large number of United States intelligence community documents. Among them were several from the CIA and the FBI where the names of Cuban émigrés appeared for a number of reasons related in one way or another with the Kennedy assassination. The investigators took notes from those documents. But immediately afterwards they were again classified as Secret and to this day they remain in that category. In 1998, The New York Times obtained access to the notes that several of the investigators of that House Committee took from the secret documents. One of these notes, taken from a CIA document, makes mention of Posada Carriles: "Posada was providing the Agency [CIA] and the FBI uninterruptedly with a torrent of valuable information about the activities of the Cuban exiles in Miami." That has been a constant in Posada Carriles' career with the CIA and the FBI. He has always been a great informant of everything that his own henchmen were doing, including his Cuban colleagues in terrorist activities and of everything he learned about anyone, or about any activity in Miami or elsewhere. Posada has always reported in detail to those two US agencies. Another example of this may be seen in the secret document dated October 8, 1976, sent by the Director of the FBI in Washington, under the category of a classified document with the "maximum level and priority", to 14 persons including "The Deputy Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Director of the CIA, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Secret Service." In that document the following text may be read: "Legat familiarized with Posada while he was (crossed out) and after his resignation, Posada continued in contact with Legat on rare occasions. The last time was on June 10, 1976, when Posada visited Legat's office to ask if the FBI was interested in Carlo Bordoni (Bufile 29168654: Oarfile 29/13). When they told him yes, Posada revealed that Bordoni had contracted two of his operatives as armed bodyguards in his home. That information was later forwarded by Legat (crossed out) who participated in the action through which Bordoni was arrested." Legat is the abbreviation used for Legal Attache, which is the cover used by FBI officers that pose as diplomats at US embassies. And Carlo Bordoni was the man that handled the scandalous secret operations of the Sindona Group in Italy, who, together with the Mafia, Vatican Bank branches, among others, were involved in serious financial and other types of crimes. Bordoni fled from Italy and hid in Venezuela, where he looked to hire bodyguards, and by chance, he hired them in the agency that Posada Carriles had opened when he left the DISIP, the Venezuelan Security and Intelligence agency. According to notes taken by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and revealed by the NYT, it may have been because of this attitude that in two CIA assessments in 1965 and 1966 of their employee/agent, Luis Faustino Clemente Posada Carriles, they stated: "he has a good character, is very trustworthy, conscious in matters related to Security." 1965 "his fulfillment of all the assigned tasks has been excellent." 1966 Thus, poor performance could not be the reason of the supposed break with the Agency. And what happened after these evaluations? According to the same The New York Times investigation, in 1967 "he achieves the position of Chief of Operations of the Venezuelan Intelligence, with the help of CIA references." What he did in Venezuela for the Agency is already known, but at the end of 1975, according to the summaries of the CIA documents by the investigators of the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations, it appears like a crisis developed between Posada and the Agency. This is the way The New York Times, which had access to these summaries, describes the cause of these problems: "...an intelligence report shows that Posada may be involved in the smuggling of cocaine from Colombia to Miami, by way of Venezuela, as well as the counterfeiting of US currency in Venezuela... the CIA decided not to confront Posada directly, so as not to compromise the investigations in progress. Posada was questioned and he was found to be guilty of only having bad friendships. Even after that, in February 1976, Agency officers decided to break off their ties with Posada. Mysteriously, the documents described worries related to pending tax matters." Taxation matters!!!, but Posada was living legally in Venezuela for the previous 9 years. But OK, if this is true, then Luis Posada Carriles' income tax statement and the IRS form corresponding to 1975, or whatever he had pending, should be made public. One of the CIA documents, drafted on October 13, 1976, just a few days after the Barbados terrorist action, and addressed to the FBI's Intelligence Division stated: "...Posada is an ex CIA agent. He was dismissed under amicable terms in July 1967, but in October of 1967, contact was re-established... we continue to hold occasional contacts with him." If the CIA had severed its ties with Posada in February of 1976, for what purpose would it continue to maintain "occasional contacts"? If you decide to sever your ties with an agent, what does keeping "occasional contacts" mean? In the synthesis of the CIA documents to which The New York Times had access, it is evident what type of "break" in its relations the Agency and Posada had between February and October of 1976. A front page article in the July 12, 1998 edition of The New York Times states: "During the following months, Posada passed information to the Agency. He alerted that Bosch and another Cuba exiles were conspiring against the nephew of the deposed leftwing President of Chile. In June of that year (1976) Posada called the CIA again to report plans by the exiles to blow up a Cuban airliner that was departing from Panama." It is interesting to note that the CIA knew by means of the mouth of its agent (or according to them, their ex-agent at that moment) such serious information like the CORU organization of Orlando Bosch plans to blow up civilian airliners in mid-flight, and did nothing to stop it. That's why, saying that there was a break in relations is something very strange. The agent remains in contact and informing, as he always did. Or would it be that Posada was not informing of what he was learning about, but that he was actually informing when the tasks that were given to him were fulfilled, those tasks that he always executed in an "excellent" manner, according to his CIA evaluation. And if it wasn't that way, then what explanation can be given to the information on what the CIA did on October 7, 1976, the day after the Barbados crime. According to what is revealed by the notes taken by the House of Representative Select Committee on Assassinations investigators and that The New York Times published in its July 12, 1998 edition: "The day after, the CIA made what it described as fruitless attempts to contact Posada." Why in less than 24 hours [after the plane bombing] did the CIA already want to talk with Posada about Barbados? Or is it that the CIA knew beforehand that Posada was linked to that terrorist attack? But after February 1976, the date that the Agency says it broke its ties with Posada, this person not only maintained contact with the CIA, but also with the FBI, as can be demonstrated in the declassified document about the meeting that he held with an FBI officer in the United States embassy in Caracas (Legat) to inform about Carlo Bordoni June 10, 1976. So that you may fully answer the question whether Posada Carriles was or wasn't an agent, we will continue next Monday with an analysis of what happened after Posada was imprisoned, why he escaped, where he went, and what was the mission assigned to him. This may help for you to draw your own conclusions. [ Next Thread | Previous Thread | Next Message | Previous Message ] |
| Subject | Author | Date |
| Em Cuba a morte foi ERRADICADA ! (NT) | ortográfico | 15/06/06 8:27:03 |