Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 06/10/05 8:56pm
In reply to:
Damoclese
's message, "Under the chestnut tree" on 06/10/05 6:41pm
>>Perhaps so (though I can only think of a very few).
>>The theory implicitly assumes, for instance, that the
>>designer designed life in such a way to be empirically
>>testable when it says, "artificial intervention is
>>necessary" for the creation of life on Earth.
>
>But the claim "artificial intervention is necessary"
>is made based on the idea of what is natural and we
>base our idea of what is natural on what humans can
>contrive
And what nature reasonably can't. There are some things that nature cannot reasonably produce but humans (granted, the only known intelligent life) can.
Note by the way that we humans can already contrive functional proteins, RNA and DNA. It's not very disputable that someday we'll be able to do the same thing with life as well.
>I don't think it'd be
>possible to detect artifical design provided it wasn't
>sufficiently human in nature. Do you disagree?
To some extent, yes. If X had a beginning, and if the currents of nature are not reasonably capable of creating X, then appealing to artificial intervention is rational even if it cannot have been human intervention and even if the designer has tastes that are radically different from our own.
>>Nonetheless, that still doesn't change the fact that
>>this theory yields empirically testable and
>>falsifiable predictions.
>
>By why bother if the fundamental assumption is flawed?
You need to be more specific. What assumption? That the design must be “sufficiently” human-like? If so, see above on what I said about that.
Background assumptions are implicitly made, but if the theory is wrong it can potentially show up in empirical testing. The theory is empirically falsifiable after all (more so than abiogenesis anyway).
>>Any empirically testable theory includes (at least
>>implicitly) some background assumptions to make
>>predictions. ID is hardly unique, and should not be
>>rejected on that basis.
>
>Well, it isn't a matter of "some" background
>assumptions but rather the sort. An adherent of ID is
>basically saying "I know that anything designed must
>be thus
That's not what we ID adherents are saying. We are saying that if artificial intervention is necessary then we should expect things like (1) no known possible way to create life will ever be found (2) multiple serious barriers to the naturalistic formation of life will be found.
Now, it’s possible that an alien designer could design something other than what ID says. But then such a theory would not be very empirically testable or falsifiable. So, ID assumes that the designer constructed life in such a way that naturalistic causes are insufficient in producing. You may not like that assumption, but it’s at least empirically testable and falsifiable. It’s certainly more falsifiable than abiogenesis (you may disagree, but then please come up with a conceivable laboratory experiment that would falsify abiogenesis).
>>So the fact that the currents of nature are evidently
>>not reasonably capable of producing the robots is just
>>an immaterial, irrelevant fact?
>
>"Evidently not reasonably capable" is quite a clause.
>It's quite immaterial if it isn't true.
But its extremely material if it is true (which it is in the "robots on Pluto" scenario).
>>We should say, "Well,
>>we don't know much about the designer, so let's all
>>pretend these robots weren't designed"?
>
>Nah, we should say "I've never seen anything else that
>isn't designed by a human although these things look a
>lot like something humans might design".
But you also seem to be saying the "Well...let's all pretend these robots weren't designed" given the circumstances (e.g. rejecting ID on the basis that we don't know who or what the designer is).
>>Would you have a better explanation how the
>>robots got there? (Remember the game of inference to
>>the best explanation.)
>
>You mean make something up like design? How about
>explosive diarrhea?
An animal's explosive diarrhea does not seem like a plausible explanation for creating robots. Intelligent design appears to be much more reasonable.
>>Not at all. Look, if naturalistic causes are
>>not reasonably capable of doing the job, why wouldn't
>>it be rational to accept design?
>
>Because our design filters are only set to detect
>human design although
Not at all. If an alien designed something that naturalistic causes are not reasonably capable of doing, it would still be rational to accept design. What species the intelligent agent is has no relevance.
In short, the basic reasoning of ID has nothing to do about the designer being sufficiently close to humans. It has to do with examining the capabilities of nature (arguing from known chemistry and mathematical probability etc.).
>>Need I remind you that the methods we use to create
>>functional proteins, RNA and DNA could not have been
>>used by abiogenesis?
>
>So what?
Well, my point was that these scientists were not emulating how abiogenesis could have supposedly produced them (which was quite pertinent given what I was responding to). ID has a known possible mechanism (for functional proteins, RNA and DNA etc.), abiogenesis does not.
>>What is reassuring that it was designed is
>>(1)the predicted lack of any known means for
>>undirected chemical reactions to get life (2) the
>>predicted serious problems and barriers for undirected
>>chemical reactions to get life (3) a known means (more
>>than abiogenesis, anyway) for ID to create life. The
>>(3) will undoubtedly reach full measure as technology
>>goes on.
>
>
>So the points that reassure you are 1) ignorance 2)
>ignorance of the processes of nature
Again, ID is arguing from what we do know about observed chemistry, mathematical probability etc. If anything, it is abiogenesis that is arguing from the ignorance of the processes of nature by e.g. appealing to laws we've never seen or observed.
>3) knowledge that
>it CAN be done artifically
Having a known mechanism to work with is better than not having one. Think of a criminal trial. The accused must have a means to commit the crime. If one suspect has a known means and opportunity but the other does not, the former suspect looks more promising (all else held constant).
Similarly, when it comes between two theories, one that has a known means is better than the theory that does not (all else held constant).
The factor isn't all determining, but it’s a factor nonetheless (like empirical falsifiability).
>>You didn't address, for
>>instance, my claim that ID explains the data better.
>
>Well that's easy because the main assumption is flawed
>as I pointed out earlier.
What assumption? That the designer necessarily has humanoid characteristics? If so, the idea that there exists this flawed assumption is itself flawed as I explained earlier.
>>No you didn't, at least you never responded to my last
>>counterexample argument.
>
>That's because your counterexample wasn't really all
>that relevant.
It is relevant because it attacked the veracity of your argument at the time. But if you wish to not discuss that particular argument, go ahead and ignore it.
>>You say that rationality and probability are not
>>necessarily one and the same. I claim that the
>>statement, “It is rational to believe belief X if it
>>is highly probable that belief X is true” is
>>necessarily true.
>
>And you are clearly wrong
By all means, please give me some shred of evidence that I am "clearly" wrong.
>because people don't believe
>things even if they are highly probable
That's not enough. People don't always behave rationally, so pointing out that some people don't always believe X even if X is highly probably true is not a good argument.
>>>ID is categorically in a philosophical position
>>
>>Really? ID is often a very scientific position as in
>>SETI and forensic science.
>
>Searching for signs of intelligent life is not the
>same as searching for ID.
It is the same because in both cases we are detecting artificial intervention (e.g. in radio waves). It seems more like special pleading to say it can't happen in biology.
>>Tossing out the theory
>>just because you personally don't like it isn't enough
>>reason to discard the theory.
>
>No you are right. That's why I don't do that.
It certainly seems that way.
>>No, but the more empirically falsifiable the theory
>>is, the better.
>
>Not really.
Yes really.
>What is really ideal is truth.
Obviously, but I'm talking about criteria to judge which theory to accept as true within science. In the discipline of science, an empirically falsifiable theory is preferable.
>>ID argues from what we do know about
>>mathematical probability and observed chemistry,
>>whereas abiogenesis here is arguing from laws we
>>don't know about and haven't observed.
>
>And again, I'm not really sure why you find this so
>reassuring
See below. All else held constant, a theory that is based on actual evidence (e.g. empirical) is better than a theory that is not based on evidence.
>>>>Note again that ID argues from what we do know
>>>>about mathematical probability and observed chemistry,
>>>>whereas abiogenesis here is arguing from laws we
>>>>don't know about and haven't observed.
>>>
>>>I don't really see where this is an advantage quite
>>>honestly.
>>
>>Here's one: remember what you were saying about an
>>argument from ignorance? That's a bad thing, right?
>
>When the subject being argued is largely shrouded in
>ignorance I'm not surprised that the theories have
>lapses.
That's going to be true for many scientific theories (more later).
Note that you seem almost hypocritical given some of your previous remarks. At one point you were criticizing ID saying it was based on arguments from ignorance. I demonstrated that was not true and suggested that it is abiogenesis that is based on ignorance. Now all of a sudden being based on ignorance doesn’t seem like such a big deal.
>>All else held constant, we accept theories that
>>have a strong connection with the evidence, what we
>>do know, over theories that do not.
>
>Except in cases where our ignorance is so pronounced
>that it doesn't really matter to begin with.
The evidence doesn't matter? That's interesting...
>>ID basis
>>its claims (at least in this case) on actual
>>evidence (e.g. empirical), abiogenesis does not.
>>All else held constant, I prefer theories that are
>>based on evidence. Why don’t you see evidential basis
>>as advantageous?
>
>Well, the problem is in this particular instance we
>have a lack of information in areas that are rather
>critical to formulating any ultimate causes.
So, favoring a theory that is based on actual evidence over a theory that isn't doesn't apply here, because there could be evidence that exonerates the other theory.
You have to realize that this is going to be true for virtually any scientific theory, particularly when the competing theories are empirically falsifiable. Because scientific theories often have unlimited empirical consequences, it is impossible to test them all. Theories are never proven. Things like inference to the best explanation are frequently the best we can hope for.
When it comes to inference to the best explanation we should accept the theory that's based on evidence over a theory that isn't. Why accept the latter theory? Because we just don't like the one that's based on evidence for (highly questionable) philosophical reasons? That's not enough to rationally reject the theory, I think.
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