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Date Posted: 22:46:59 03/19/02 Tue
Author: David E. Sanger
Subject: Would U.S. make a first strike?

Would U.S. make a first strike?
David E. Sanger The New York Times

White House is deliberately vague on its nuclear policy

WASHINGTON President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have rarely missed an opportunity in recent weeks to warn that they will do whatever it takes to keep President Saddam Hussein, or any other hostile power, from obtaining nuclear or biological weapons.
.
But the White House suddenly grew nervous after the leak of a Pentagon report suggesting one possible strategy for stopping them: a quick strike with a low-yield nuclear weapon designed to burrow deep into the earth and wipe out sites where such weapons are produced or stored.
.
Allies and nuclear strategists began asking a question not heard in Washington for decades: Would the president ever consider a preemptive nuclear strike?
.
The answers have ranged from "not likely" to "no comment." Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted several times that there had been no change in nuclear policy.
.
The White House spokesman took the unusual step of quoting statements by two of former President Bill Clinton's defense secretaries warning potential rivals that they would face an overwhelming and devastating response if they threatened nuclear or biological attack.
.
In interviews, top aides to Bush noted that despite his aggressive language about Iraq and the "axis of evil," the president had never said that he would consider using specially designed nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike.
.
"We do not have a declared policy of preemption," a senior administration official said Friday. "We have a strategy of deterrence."
.
At the same time, this official added, it is important to develop deep-burrowing nuclear weapons in order to "hold at risk" any county's hardened, underground nuclear or biological weapons and laboratories. The new American weapons are needed, the official said, to make sure that there is no safe place to develop nuclear and biological weapons, and to discourage countries from trying.
.
Yet ambiguity is everything in nuclear deterrence.
.
Taken together, Bush's language, his advisers' statements and the Pentagon Nuclear Posture Review, which was leaked last week, suggest that Bush sees some advantage in keeping the world guessing about how the United States would respond to evidence that a country or a terrorist group was hiding weapons of mass destruction deep underground.
.
So the administration reached for phrases that left some strategic wiggle room, to sow reassurance at home and doubt in Iran, Iraq and North Korea.
.
Bush will not discuss it, naturally, and he said last week that "the nuclear review is not new," suggesting that the Clinton administration was headed in the same direction.
.
Then, muddying the waters, he added, "We've got all options on the table, because we want to make it very clear to nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us or our allies." China and North Korea, among other countries, say they believe that the policy is both new and aggressive. Beijing accused Washington over the weekend of trying to commit "nuclear blackmail." No doubt Chinese leaders, among others, are trying to figure out how this president thinks about the unthinkable. President Harry Truman unleashed atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and never looked back, but he also refused General Douglas MacArthur's request to use them in Korea. President John F. Kennedy had to face the prospect in the Cuban missile crisis. But the strategic calculations that went on in the past are different from those under way in the Bush White House because deterring superpowers is very different from deterring a Saddam Hussein.
.
It is widely accepted that nuclear weapons are virtually useless in a war on terrorism or on rogue states, and in the case of America's nuclear arsenal that is particularly true.
.
As the Nuclear Posture Review notes, the American arsenal is overwhelmingly based on Cold War thinking, when deterrence meant convincing rivals that the United States possessed the ability to wipe out their cities and missile silos. Bush has said that approach is outdated and has embraced deep cuts in America's traditional nuclear arsenal. Terrorists do not have cities, and Iraq and Iran do not have silos.
.
So the discussion under way in Washington focuses on what amounts to a specialty use of a nuclear weapon: harnessing a nuclear blast to dig deep underground and cause a seismic wave that would collapse an underground nuclear site. The idea would be to keep nuclear fallout to a minimum.
.
So far the United States has only one earth-penetrating nuclear weapon that might get at underground sites, the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. The Pentagon report warned that this weapon "cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located."
.
A study is under way to figure out how that weapon could be modified to get the job done, with more blast and less radiation, though that might take a decade. Still, the discussion has prompted questions that the White House wants to quash, while leaving Saddam wondering.
.
"The danger of this way of thinking," said a former Clinton administration nuclear strategist, "is that it treats a nuclear weapon as just one instrument you have available. Of course, no president would use it if he could get the job done with a conventional weapon. But what if the CIA director walks into the Oval Office one day and says, 'Mr. President, we know where there are nuclear and biological weapons deep down in Tora Bora, but the only way to get at them is with a nuclear weapon.'?" Powell, eager to calm the diplomatic waters, made a point of restating American policy, saying that the United States would not use a nuclear weapon preemptively against a state that had promised not to build nuclear weapons of its own. That policy was meant to encourage countries to join the nonproliferation treaty. Administration officials say Powell was absolutely right. But then, preserving ambiguity, they note that the policy might not apply to a country that signed the treaty but then built nuclear weapons anyway - Iraq, for example.
White House is deliberately vague on its nuclear policy

WASHINGTON President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have rarely missed an opportunity in recent weeks to warn that they will do whatever it takes to keep President Saddam Hussein, or any other hostile power, from obtaining nuclear or biological weapons.
.
But the White House suddenly grew nervous after the leak of a Pentagon report suggesting one possible strategy for stopping them: a quick strike with a low-yield nuclear weapon designed to burrow deep into the earth and wipe out sites where such weapons are produced or stored.
.
Allies and nuclear strategists began asking a question not heard in Washington for decades: Would the president ever consider a preemptive nuclear strike?
.
The answers have ranged from "not likely" to "no comment." Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted several times that there had been no change in nuclear policy.
.
The White House spokesman took the unusual step of quoting statements by two of former President Bill Clinton's defense secretaries warning potential rivals that they would face an overwhelming and devastating response if they threatened nuclear or biological attack.
.
In interviews, top aides to Bush noted that despite his aggressive language about Iraq and the "axis of evil," the president had never said that he would consider using specially designed nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike.
.
"We do not have a declared policy of preemption," a senior administration official said Friday. "We have a strategy of deterrence."
.
At the same time, this official added, it is important to develop deep-burrowing nuclear weapons in order to "hold at risk" any county's hardened, underground nuclear or biological weapons and laboratories. The new American weapons are needed, the official said, to make sure that there is no safe place to develop nuclear and biological weapons, and to discourage countries from trying.
.
Yet ambiguity is everything in nuclear deterrence.
.
Taken together, Bush's language, his advisers' statements and the Pentagon Nuclear Posture Review, which was leaked last week, suggest that Bush sees some advantage in keeping the world guessing about how the United States would respond to evidence that a country or a terrorist group was hiding weapons of mass destruction deep underground.
.
So the administration reached for phrases that left some strategic wiggle room, to sow reassurance at home and doubt in Iran, Iraq and North Korea.
.
Bush will not discuss it, naturally, and he said last week that "the nuclear review is not new," suggesting that the Clinton administration was headed in the same direction.
.
Then, muddying the waters, he added, "We've got all options on the table, because we want to make it very clear to nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us or our allies." China and North Korea, among other countries, say they believe that the policy is both new and aggressive. Beijing accused Washington over the weekend of trying to commit "nuclear blackmail." No doubt Chinese leaders, among others, are trying to figure out how this president thinks about the unthinkable. President Harry Truman unleashed atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and never looked back, but he also refused General Douglas MacArthur's request to use them in Korea. President John F. Kennedy had to face the prospect in the Cuban missile crisis. But the strategic calculations that went on in the past are different from those under way in the Bush White House because deterring superpowers is very different from deterring a Saddam Hussein.
.
It is widely accepted that nuclear weapons are virtually useless in a war on terrorism or on rogue states, and in the case of America's nuclear arsenal that is particularly true.
.
As the Nuclear Posture Review notes, the American arsenal is overwhelmingly based on Cold War thinking, when deterrence meant convincing rivals that the United States possessed the ability to wipe out their cities and missile silos. Bush has said that approach is outdated and has embraced deep cuts in America's traditional nuclear arsenal. Terrorists do not have cities, and Iraq and Iran do not have silos.
.
So the discussion under way in Washington focuses on what amounts to a specialty use of a nuclear weapon: harnessing a nuclear blast to dig deep underground and cause a seismic wave that would collapse an underground nuclear site. The idea would be to keep nuclear fallout to a minimum.
.
So far the United States has only one earth-penetrating nuclear weapon that might get at underground sites, the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. The Pentagon report warned that this weapon "cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located."
.
A study is under way to figure out how that weapon could be modified to get the job done, with more blast and less radiation, though that might take a decade. Still, the discussion has prompted questions that the White House wants to quash, while leaving Saddam wondering.
.
"The danger of this way of thinking," said a former Clinton administration nuclear strategist, "is that it treats a nuclear weapon as just one instrument you have available. Of course, no president would use it if he could get the job done with a conventional weapon. But what if the CIA director walks into the Oval Office one day and says, 'Mr. President, we know where there are nuclear and biological weapons deep down in Tora Bora, but the only way to get at them is with a nuclear weapon.'?" Powell, eager to calm the diplomatic waters, made a point of restating American policy, saying that the United States would not use a nuclear weapon preemptively against a state that had promised not to build nuclear weapons of its own. That policy was meant to encourage countries to join the nonproliferation treaty. Administration officials say Powell was absolutely right. But then, preserving ambiguity, they note that the policy might not apply to a country that signed the treaty but then built nuclear weapons anyway - Iraq, for example.
White House is deliberately vague on its nuclear policy

WASHINGTON President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have rarely missed an opportunity in recent weeks to warn that they will do whatever it takes to keep President Saddam Hussein, or any other hostile power, from obtaining nuclear or biological weapons.
.
But the White House suddenly grew nervous after the leak of a Pentagon report suggesting one possible strategy for stopping them: a quick strike with a low-yield nuclear weapon designed to burrow deep into the earth and wipe out sites where such weapons are produced or stored.
.
Allies and nuclear strategists began asking a question not heard in Washington for decades: Would the president ever consider a preemptive nuclear strike?
.
The answers have ranged from "not likely" to "no comment." Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted several times that there had been no change in nuclear policy.
.
The White House spokesman took the unusual step of quoting statements by two of former President Bill Clinton's defense secretaries warning potential rivals that they would face an overwhelming and devastating response if they threatened nuclear or biological attack.
.
In interviews, top aides to Bush noted that despite his aggressive language about Iraq and the "axis of evil," the president had never said that he would consider using specially designed nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike.
.
"We do not have a declared policy of preemption," a senior administration official said Friday. "We have a strategy of deterrence."
.
At the same time, this official added, it is important to develop deep-burrowing nuclear weapons in order to "hold at risk" any county's hardened, underground nuclear or biological weapons and laboratories. The new American weapons are needed, the official said, to make sure that there is no safe place to develop nuclear and biological weapons, and to discourage countries from trying.
.
Yet ambiguity is everything in nuclear deterrence.
.
Taken together, Bush's language, his advisers' statements and the Pentagon Nuclear Posture Review, which was leaked last week, suggest that Bush sees some advantage in keeping the world guessing about how the United States would respond to evidence that a country or a terrorist group was hiding weapons of mass destruction deep underground.
.
So the administration reached for phrases that left some strategic wiggle room, to sow reassurance at home and doubt in Iran, Iraq and North Korea.
.
Bush will not discuss it, naturally, and he said last week that "the nuclear review is not new," suggesting that the Clinton administration was headed in the same direction.
.
Then, muddying the waters, he added, "We've got all options on the table, because we want to make it very clear to nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us or our allies." China and North Korea, among other countries, say they believe that the policy is both new and aggressive. Beijing accused Washington over the weekend of trying to commit "nuclear blackmail." No doubt Chinese leaders, among others, are trying to figure out how this president thinks about the unthinkable. President Harry Truman unleashed atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and never looked back, but he also refused General Douglas MacArthur's request to use them in Korea. President John F. Kennedy had to face the prospect in the Cuban missile crisis. But the strategic calculations that went on in the past are different from those under way in the Bush White House because deterring superpowers is very different from deterring a Saddam Hussein.
.
It is widely accepted that nuclear weapons are virtually useless in a war on terrorism or on rogue states, and in the case of America's nuclear arsenal that is particularly true.
.
As the Nuclear Posture Review notes, the American arsenal is overwhelmingly based on Cold War thinking, when deterrence meant convincing rivals that the United States possessed the ability to wipe out their cities and missile silos. Bush has said that approach is outdated and has embraced deep cuts in America's traditional nuclear arsenal. Terrorists do not have cities, and Iraq and Iran do not have silos.
.
So the discussion under way in Washington focuses on what amounts to a specialty use of a nuclear weapon: harnessing a nuclear blast to dig deep underground and cause a seismic wave that would collapse an underground nuclear site. The idea would be to keep nuclear fallout to a minimum.
.
So far the United States has only one earth-penetrating nuclear weapon that might get at underground sites, the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. The Pentagon report warned that this weapon "cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located."
.
A study is under way to figure out how that weapon could be modified to get the job done, with more blast and less radiation, though that might take a decade. Still, the discussion has prompted questions that the White House wants to quash, while leaving Saddam wondering.
.
"The danger of this way of thinking," said a former Clinton administration nuclear strategist, "is that it treats a nuclear weapon as just one instrument you have available. Of course, no president would use it if he could get the job done with a conventional weapon. But what if the CIA director walks into the Oval Office one day and says, 'Mr. President, we know where there are nuclear and biological weapons deep down in Tora Bora, but the only way to get at them is with a nuclear weapon.'?" Powell, eager to calm the diplomatic waters, made a point of restating American policy, saying that the United States would not use a nuclear weapon preemptively against a state that had promised not to build nuclear weapons of its own. That policy was meant to encourage countries to join the nonproliferation treaty. Administration officials say Powell was absolutely right. But then, preserving ambiguity, they note that the policy might not apply to a country that signed the treaty but then built nuclear weapons anyway - Iraq, for example.

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