Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 03/20/02 5:37pm
In reply to:
Ben
's message, "Fundamental... ah, I can't think of any more" on 02/25/02 7:15pm
>>>And herein lies the problem. You treat atheism as a
>>>belief system, and it need not be. A person can
>>>easily fall into the category of "atheist" by simply
>>>saying, "I see no reason to believe in God."
>>
>>I could just as easily turn the tables. I can claim
>>that a person can fall into the category of “theist”
>>by simply saying, “I see no reason not to believe in
>>God.” But I am treating this as an intellectual
>>search for the truth. According to Merriam
>>Webster’s Dictionary (10th edition) definition 2b
>>of atheism is “the doctrine that there is no deity.”
>>That is precisely what I mean when I use the term
>>“atheism.” Either God exists or He does not exist.
>>Both atheism and theism are propositions of reality.
>>They make claims about reality that are either true or
>>false and are thus, in this manner, “belief systems.”
>
>Yes, but my point is that the only claim the word
>"atheist" _necessarily_ means a person is making is
>that there isn't a God. An atheist, at least by my
>definition, makes no claims about how the universe
>should or shouldn't be.
Very well, let’s take atheism in a more “raw” form, and let’s compare it with my theistic philosophy: a rationally orderly God created the universe. But before doing that, let me tell you about what I consider to be explanatory power and how it’s used as a factor in rationally favoring one theory over an empirically identical competitor.
Consider a detective working to solve a murder mystery, and has this theory: suspect X did it. Suppose that the detective learns that the suspect has bragged about the murder, does not have an alibi, and that the knife he owns is the same type of knife that killed the murder victim. Even though the detective’s theory (which simply states that suspect X murdered the victim) does not actually predict this data, the theory explains these observations. The detective’s theory, even if it is not really proven yet, has more explanatory power than simply saying, “That’s just the way it is.” The detective’s theory is more intellectually satisfying because the data “flow more naturally,” compared to the “that’s just the way it is” theory. Notably, these observations that the detective learned did not have to exist. Other sets of data are also very possible. Indeed, under the detective’s theory, some sets of data “fit better” than others. For example, the above clues (e.g. suspect X having no alibi, bragged about killing etc.) are more “harmonious” with the detective’s theory compared the world where none of the clues above existed and instead suspect X had an alibi. In the latter world, the detective could claim that the person providing suspect X’s alibi is lying, and this would indeed be a possibility. But even so, the other set of observations (the suspect having no alibi etc.) is a “better fit” for the detective’s theory. If the data happen to be a set that is much more “affable” with the theory relative to other possible data sets, then this provides some degree of rational support for the detective’s theory. Often one might ask, “What kind of data would best support my theory?” in a particular subject area (e.g. the subject of whether or not the suspect has an alibi) to engage in rational investigation and can be helpful if the answer to this question matches up to the data in the real world.
Unfortunately, there is no rigorous logical procedure that tells us to what extent the empirical data are “harmonious” with a theory. Instead, we intuitively feel how well a theory fits the data, rather than having a precise logical method for such judgments. Indeed, different people can look at the exact same data and disagree about which theory most rationally explains the observations. This can indeed be a problem, but these sorts of principles (use of explanatory power etc.) are the best that we mortals can do in such empirical investigations. (Fortunately for us the problem is not all pervasive. Unlike science and philosophy, a priori disciplines like mathematics and symbolic logic don’t really encounter the problem of subjectively interpreting empirical data and thus can be capable of rigorous proofs).
Now on to some data on the order of the universe. Mathematics is an intellectual activity that began in Greece in the 6th century B.C.E. by Pythagoras and developed by Euclid and Aristotle. Their studies began with straight lines and circles and extended to ellipses, created through sectioning cones. In the third century, B.C.E., Apollonias of Perga wrote eight monumental volumes devoted to these curves, describing their properties as “miraculous.” Yet it never occurred to these early mathematicians that such beautiful abstract forms from mathematics were in fact descriptions of real world phenomena. Yet this is indeed the case, even though it is logically possible for the universe to have constantly changing physical laws that do not operate in mathematical ways. There is a uniformity to nature, and it consistently operates in ways that can only be described precisely using a considerable level of complex mathematics. The universe did not have to be this way at all, but it is. Albert Einstein in a letter to a friend (1956, Lettres a Maurice Solovine) commenting on the mathematical comprehensibility of the world noted,You may find it strange that I consider the comprehensibility of the world to the degree that we may speak of such comprehensibility as a miracle or an eternal mystery. Well, a priori one should expect a chaotic world, which cannot be in any way grasped through thought... The kind of order created, for example, by Newton's theory of gravity is of quite a different kind. Even if the axioms of the theory are posited by a human being, the success of such an enterprise presupposes an order in the objective world of a high degree, which one has no a priori right to expect. That is the miracle which grows increasingly persuasive with the increasing development of knowledge. The physicist Eugene Wigner in the widely quoted paper entitled The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Physical Sciences (Comm. Pure and Appl. Math, 1960) notes that the scientist often takes for granted the remarkable effectiveness of mathematics in describing the real world. To quote Wigner: The enormous usefulness of mathematics is something bordering on the mysterious......There is no rational explanation for it.......The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve...... For no a priori reason under atheism, nature consistently operates in mathematical patterns. Indeed, nature cannot be described precisely without high-level mathematics to explain its patterns. What can atheism say here about the fantastic level of mathematical sophistication and consistency on the processes of our universe? “That’s just the way it is”? Like in the detective example, simply saying, “that’s just the way it is” can have relatively weak explanatory power. Theism provides a bit stronger degree of explanatory power for this order: a rationally orderly God created the universe.
Another evidential argument on the order of the universe that has become fairly well known in theological circles is the “fine-tuning” of the physical constants. That is, if the physical constants in the universe were altered even slightly, no life could have possibly existed. Like the mathematics thing, the universe doesn’t have to be “fine-tuned” for life. It is logically possible for the universe not to have these “fine-tuned” physical constants. And yet it does. Is it very rational to believe that our universe just happens to have precisely the right constants, to simply say, “That’s just the way it is”? That sort of belief strikes me as having terribly impotent explanatory power compared to the theory of a rationally orderly God creating the universe.
>>>I do not think it is fair for you to assume that
>>>people know what you mean by the word "atheist".
>>
>>I thought the standard dictionary definition would
>>suffice in the context of these circumstances. If not
>>I apologize. I hope I have made myself clear in this
>>post.
>
>Yes, but your "standard dictionary definition" is not
>the one you offered to me before. The standard
>definition is "Someone who does not believe in God,"
>and the context of my quote was that you were
>discussing "classical atheism."
I think it was clear that I was referring to “classical atheism” in that paragraph you’re referring to, mainly because I explicitly stated the term “classical atheism” this post. In the other contexts (e.g. the order of the universe) I’m using a more “standard definition.”
>You seem
>to think there is something wrong with saying, "That's
>just the way it is." But let's say you are right...
>let's say there is an invisible being in the sky.
>What if I asked you, "WHY is God up there? How did he
>get there?" If I asked questions like that, I'm sure
>at some point your answer would look a lot like,
>"That's just the way it is."
I’m not sure how you would see my explanation. But to answer your question of “How did God get there?”, I would say that God never began to exist.
>By that same token, I
>can think that nature just _does_ operate in
>mathematical patterns. Maybe there is no "why" about
>it.
Such an idea is precisely the problem. To illustrate I’ll use an example. Evolution is an explanatory theory. That is, it explains why certain data exist. Suppose you adduce lots of empirical evidence that evolution explains (fossil sequencing, certain similarities between life forms, etc.) and suppose I say that evolution is wrong. My explanation? “That’s just the way it is,” and there is no “why” about the data you showed me. Would you be skeptical? I feel the same sort of skepticism with the notion that there is no “why” about the data I presented, at least in part because of the explanatory power factor.
>>The universe
>>does not have to be the way that it is. It is
>>logically possible for nature to behave in completely
>>random and non-mathematical ways, for example.
>
>And what would such a universe be like? Since it's
>"logically possible," please explain what would be
>different in this kind of universe.
One that behaves more randomly and without physical laws as we know them. For example, picture a universe where gravity doesn’t always work. Rocks don’t always fall when pushed off a cliff. Sometimes they float up, sometimes they go down, and sometimes they fly around in all sorts of crazy directions. Sometimes gasoline catches fire when a lit match is on it, and sometimes it doesn’t even if the conditions are identical. The speed of light constantly changes and sometimes it doesn’t even move at all. There is no uniformity of nature, and hardly anything operates in mathematical patterns. Or even better: a universe where all of the fundamental physical constants wildly fluctuate. This is an example of a universe that is random and behaves relatively non-mathematically.
>>I
>>think theism does that better than atheism. The law
>>of propagation (the maximum speed of light)
>>consistently holds in all frames of reference in a way
>>that I think is rather remarkable.
>
>I find it very _interesting_, but not _remarkable_
I suppose it depends on the person. When I first read about this sort of thing, I first nearly thought, “It can’t be done!” But it can. It does it in a way that I think is rather remarkable.
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