| Subject: Like Mike |
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Damoclese
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Date Posted: 04/25/05 7:54pm
In reply to:
Wade A. Tisthammer
's message, "Please answer my questions regarding what Damoclese likes." on 04/14/05 4:08pm
>
>Well, we manipulate what is already there to create
>computers, cars etc.
Yes and no. It's like the difference between painting the Mona Lisa and calling it art and drawing a mustache on the Mona Lisa and calling THAT art. One of them involves would I would strictly define as "making" something and the other involves a "modification" of something that was already there.
that nature can�t reasonably
>produce. That we won�t have created life when we
>artificially create life does not seem logical.
Except when we make life, it's always like drawing a mustache on the Mona Lisa; we haven't really MADE it per se so much as we manipulated something that was already existing.
>
>Why did I mention it as ostensibly advancing one
>theory over the other? One: because (it seemed) that
>what you proposed as detecting intelligent design had
>to do with us seeing humans making something (e.g.
>artifacts) and not seeing nature make it.
Which would be a valid point, if we in fact MADE life, which I don't think it can be said that we do.
Two: here we will have one theory
>(artificial creation) that has a known cause and
I'm not sure that just because we assume a creator made things that that somehow increases our knowledge of cause all that well. It simply sets the question back another step.
>mechanisms, whereas the other theory will not
>have a known cause (naturalistic formation) and will
>still have many unresolved problems that the other
>theory accounts for and explains.
Except the other theory doesn't account for and explain the data any better and in fact opens up cans of worms that make the whole situation worse.
>
>If such a circumstance arose (and I believe it
>inevitably will), why would one not accept ID?
>Because we just don�t like it philosophically?
Nah. We shouldn't accept it because in the end it doesn't really help explain things in a very neat way, and furthermore it appeals to an agent that I think is safe to say is probably supernatural. Supernatural elements are left out of theories because they do not help explain data. They explain it away.
>
>They did in the scenario I described. Humans already
>make DNA and RNA in ways nature can�t (e.g. through
>the use of man-made machinery).
Making DNA and RNA is not the same as MAKING life itself.
>
>
>Well, when creating art or watches or any other
>machine we manipulate what is already there. We take
>pre-existing materials to make what we want. I�m not
>sure what point you�re trying to make here.
Not quite as I said above.
Can modern ID make predictions which, if
>falsified, put the theory in very serious trouble?
>Absolutely. The fact that modern ID can be
>falsified (more so, it seems, than organic evolution)
>gives it some sway over organic evolution.
Except that ID never actually commits to A designer by which it could be falsified.
>
>This sounds like more handwaving, given the numerous
>unresolved problems and global disciplinary failure to
>find any possible means organic evolution could have
>happened. If organic evolution is to really work as a
>live scientific theory, it�ll need more than rhetoric
>(�plausible,� �compelling� etc.).
Exactly how could a designer have happened, just out of curiosity?
>
>Not at all. It makes almost no mention of what the
>designer is except that it exists.
Which makes it less than a comprehensive theory. It NEEDS to mention what designer in order to make predictions that would fall in line with what we would expect should a designer of a certain character be involved. When we say something was designed we always mean implicitly by humans and that is why it makes sense that something was designed in the first place.
>
>You seem to drastically misunderstand ID. Of
>course it posits a designer.
I should have said a particular designer.
>
>You evidently don�t understand how the filter works.
>Remember my summary of it: if law/chance are
>inadequate, design is chosen. What you did is propose
>an example where law/chance were adequate, and
>if they indeed were, and the filter was given correct
>information, the filter would stop there and not
>choose design.
Law and chance TOGETHER are adequate, but neither by themselves are. That's why the filter fails.
>
>Not necessarily. If chance adequately explains it,
>then the filter would stop at the �chance� node,
>remember?
But chance by itself doesn't adequately explain it.
>
>You appear to be inconsistent. You said chance does
>explain it (and I agree)
Chance by itself does not explain it. It isn't just totally chance that the results in QM turn out as they do. Rather, it's a combination of chance and LAW together. Chance by itself producing a given pattern over and over would seem to go against the conception of chance, don't you think?
>
>Ah, so that�s it. What happens in the filter
>if the event involves both laws and random chance like
>your example? Then it fits into one of the �chance�
>nodes (e.g. IP), because on the whole it has a
>finite chance of happening.
Then I suppose EVERYTHING would fit into the chance node, as I know of nothing that doesn't have a finite chance of happening. (At least nothing that is rooted in empirical life) If anything, this would show the filter is inadequate because QM is not purely chance oriented.
Does design too fit into the chance nodes? If that's the case, which is it design or chance?
>>
>>That's like saying a piece of a pecan pie is the same
>>as the WHOLE pie, which doesn't make any sense.
>
>That�s like saying integral estimations are inaccurate
>because they don�t use all the data, which doesn�t
>make any sense.
And estimation by definition doesn't use all the data. That's quite a bit different than making an equality statement.
>So the filter is valid, which is the point I�ve been
>trying to make this entire thread. If law/chance are
>inadequate, design is chosen. I don�t see why this
>should be so controversial.
I've pointed out a situation (QM) which I don't think the filter is valid because it is constructed in such a way so as to be unfamilar with processes that are outside of the way we think the world normally operates.
Nonetheless, even if the filter is completely valid, it doesn't mean anything because it doesn't mean that the filter is TRUE or RELEVANT as concerns reality, and THAT is the point I've been making this entire thread.
>
>Nor have you given any reason why it should be. Your
>alleged counterexample involved a situation in which
>chance was adequate, thus the filter never would have
>chosen design.
Except chance by itself isn't adequate. It doesn't make sense that chance would produce the exact same pattern time and time again, does it?
For a counterexample to really work,
>you�d need an example of an event in which neither law
>nor chance can adequately explain, but the answer is
>not design. Good luck with that.
I think QM meets that criteria unless you are prepared to admit chaos as something that was also designed.
There is nothing about this definition
>that implies that an inference can�t be rational or
>reasonable.
No, and there is nothing to imply that it, in fact, WILL BE reasonable or rational and that's the problem.
>
>
>I�ve already dealt with this, given two reasons why
>this is flawed.
Except you really didn't. You just basically said "Well, it isn't any business of psychology's" which it clearly is. If you desire to model how people think, you deal with psychology.
>
>Yep, but in general when we attribute design we don�t
>do so when nature is too easily capable of it.
>Suppose we find an icicle. It could be made
>artificially, but we generally don�t make a design
>inference.
Sometimes we do because we don't know all that nature is capable of. Some rock formations look designed like tables or faces and it's extremely hard to tell whether or not they were in fact designed.
>
>Hence there is one weakness with the explanatory
>filter. It can (when given correct info) eliminate
>false positives, but it cannot eliminate false
>negatives.
That ain't the only one.
>
>Not only that, but the currents of nature just can�t
>reasonably account for it. Remember, I said
>could, not did. To repeat: If you
>walked up to an archaeologist and claimed that
>so-and-so artifact (e.g. Rosetta Stone) could
>have been produced naturally, she�s likely to say
>something along the lines of �not bloody likely.�
The currents of nature COULD account for it, but because we know people generally do things with language and because the Rosetta stone looks like something that falls within the parameters we know people can design, we infer that it was in fact designed. I'd say it has very little to do with what we expect from nature itself and quite a bit more to do with what we expect from humans.
>
>Life may have no known purpose but could just as
>easily fall into one of these categories (e.g.
>aesthetic). Just because we don�t know for certain
>the purpose is not problematic.
It BECOMES problematic because we don't know the purpose AND we know that it doesn't fall within the parameters of design that we can expect from humans. So far, I have yet to see a person build life from the ground up Mona Lisa style.
>And again, life can just as easily fit this category
>(humans can make life), thus undercutting this
>objection.
It doesn't really undercut that objection because humans do not MAKE life anymore than people MAKE icecubes. It's just a loose way of speaking in this case indicating that a manipulation took place that we had some immeadiate piece of.
What if we see humans make life from its
>basic components but there are still no known natural
>means and the old paradigm still has its unresolved
>problems? What then?
If humans MAKE life, then we know that it can be MADE which means that there is a possibility that it WAS made to begin with. However, knowing that something CAN be made does not mean that it was in fact made and it doesn't mean that we should simply flock to design as the answer to all of our woes.
>
>Additionally, you have repeatedly avoided an important
>question of mine that I would (please) like you to
>answer. How long should we put up with the current
>paradigm�s unresolved problems before we switch to the
>new paradigm that solves (and even predicts) those
>kinds of problems?
"The new paradigm" is not very promising for reasons I stated earlier but the answer to your question is "until something better comes along" and that something better is so far not ID.
How many more decades of
>fruitless research in resolving the problems with the
>current paradigm should continue before accepting
>ID? Thirty years? A century? Never? Should we
>just accept the old paradigm no matter what?
No, we should accept it until something better comes along. If nothing better EVER comes along, then it would seem that's the best we can do.
>
>I believe it is perfectly acceptable to try and solve
>the old paradigm's problems before switching to a new
>one. But at some point I think we must give up the
>old paradigm if the problems remain unresolved (given
>a new paradigm that solves those problems etc.).
Yes, that's true, but the point at which you give up on the old paradigm is when the new ones are clearly superior and don't appeal to things like supernatural causes.
>
>Like it or not, modern ID theory makes these
>kinds of testable and falsifiable predictions. And
>there is reason to believe about this aspect of
>the designer: lots of unresolved problems with
>naturalistic explanations.
Problems with one theory don't automatically support another, like it or not.
>
>Because it would contradict modern ID theory (the
>filter would never choose �design�).
Heaven forbid the designer contradict ID theory!
Also, things
>that are designed often fit into this category anyway
>(things that can�t be reasonably explained by
>law/chance).
Yeah yeah, a butterfly flaps it's wings in Texas and BLAM! Design.
There�s another reason: this brand of ID
>makes testable and falsifiable predictions.
I don't see why a naturalistic ID theory wouldn't make falsifiable predictions.
There�s nothing inherently
>wrong with having a theory that makes falsifiable
>predictions.
No, there isn't, but when that theory picks and chooses certain initial conditions, it becomes awfully suspect.
>
>I didn�t say �current form,� nonetheless it is true
>that this ad hoc hypothesis can (and has) been
>used to prevent the empirical falsification of organic
>evolution. My point remains the same: this
>observation does nothing to falsify the theory of
>organic evolution. Hence my claim that organic
>evolution seems awfully non-falsifiable.
When you make a straw man and you beat it with a stick, it pretty much doesn't do anything to fight back against the assumptions you stuffed it with. You made it sound as if ALL scientists reason this way, and they don't. Acknowledging possibilities is perfectally acceptable in science, EVEN if they don't happen to agree with design.
>
>The problem with organic evolution is that this will
>always happen. Look at both examples I made:
>neither observation can falsify the theory. So what
>could?
Having the designer of life come down and having a chat.
>
>That�s nice. But you still didn�t answer my question.
> Given the scenario I depicted earlier: life began to
>exist and the odds of organic evolution being true are
>less than one in a trillion. Would you still accept
>organic evolution in spite of the evidence?
As opposed to?
>
>
>>and the choices on this test are not a)
>>organic evolution or b) design.
>
>Perhaps you can point to another?
It would be a little hard to point to things which aren't yet known, wouldn't it? I'm sure with a little imagination you could think of hybrid scenarios and perhaps other fantastic causes for the origin of life. You'd simply rather not.
>
>Yes, the form of ID chosen is testable and
>falsifiable. Dembski did indeed define a theory
>called �intelligent design� that makes falsifiable
>predictions. But so what? I wouldn�t blame
>evolutionists for choosing forms of evolutionary
>theory that are testable and falsifiable. The
>�premises� are an inherent and unavoidable part of
>nearly any scientific theory. For instance, atomic
>theory uses its premises to fit the data (the Bohr
>model rejected in place of something else etc.). The
>specifics of the theory are often what makes it
>scientific, testable, and able to make falsifiable
>predictions. It is something to be commended, not
>criticized.
Mostly it has to do with the fact that ID is an attempt to smuggle God in the back door at the end of the day. You can deny that claim all you like, but I think we both know that's really what the whole debate is about and I think every person implicitly knows that to be true. That is what makes ID less than a decent theory; it's a hollowed out old argument that's been made and refuted in a dozen other forms.
>
>As I explained before, because they are made by the
>same designer.
And why would any designer besides a human have cause to use the same pieces over and over?
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