Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 04/26/05 5:10pm
In reply to:
Damoclese
's message, "Like Mike" on 04/25/05 7:54pm
>>Well, we manipulate what is already there to create
>>computers, cars etc.
>
>Yes and no. It's like the difference between painting
>the Mona Lisa and calling it art and drawing a
>mustache on the Mona Lisa and calling THAT art. One of
>them involves would I would strictly define as
>"making" something and the other involves a
>"modification" of something that was already there.
>
> that nature can’t reasonably
>>produce. That we won’t have created life when we
>>artificially create life does not seem logical.
>
>Except when we make life, it's always like drawing a
>mustache on the Mona Lisa; we haven't really MADE it
>per se so much as we manipulated something that was
>already existing.
That's not the case. A closer analogy would be painting a copy of the Mona Lisa. Scientists can indeed make DNA from scratch, as I pointed out before.
>>Why did I mention it as ostensibly advancing one
>>theory over the other? One: because (it seemed) that
>>what you proposed as detecting intelligent design had
>>to do with us seeing humans making something (e.g.
>>artifacts) and not seeing nature make it.
>
>Which would be a valid point, if we in fact MADE life
Not yet. We did in the thought experiment. The thought experiment was to demonstrate a point.
>>Two: here we will have one theory
>>(artificial creation) that has a known cause and
>
>I'm not sure that just because we assume a creator
>made things that that somehow increases our knowledge
>of cause all that well.
You’re missing the point. The new theory (ID) will have a known means, possible...
>>mechanisms, whereas the other theory will not
>>have a known cause (naturalistic formation) and will
>>still have many unresolved problems that the other
>>theory accounts for and explains.
>
>Except the other theory doesn't account for and
>explain the data any better
On what grounds? The new theory predicts the existence of such problems, and the existence of the unresolved problems is hardly beneficial to the old theory (if anything, their existence is problematic).
>>If such a circumstance arose (and I believe it
>>inevitably will), why would one not accept ID?
>>Because we just don't like it philosophically?
>
>Nah. We shouldn't accept it because in the end it
>doesn't really help explain things in a very neat way
So in other words, you just don't like it philosophically (the philosophical requirement being what you consider to be a "neat way").
To recap, in this scenario we have one theory (artificial creation) that has a known cause and mechanisms, whereas the other theory does not have a known cause (naturalistic formation) and still has many unresolved problems that the other theory accounts for and explains.
But we reject the new theory on the basis of it not being a "neat" explanation (whatever that means).
>and furthermore it appeals to an agent that I think is
>safe to say is probably supernatural.
On what grounds do you say that? Designing life doesn't require the supernatural, it requires a lot of intelligence. Remember, in this scenario we humans who have artificially created life without using the supernatural.
>>They did in the scenario I described. Humans already
>>make DNA and RNA in ways nature can't (e.g. through
>>the use of man-made machinery).
>
>Making DNA and RNA is not the same as MAKING life
>itself.
I didn't say it did. Nonetheless, we are on are way there technologically, and ID has a known means for creating DNA whereas abiogenesis doesn't.
>>Can modern ID make predictions which, if
>>falsified, put the theory in very serious trouble?
>>Absolutely. The fact that modern ID can be
>>falsified (more so, it seems, than organic evolution)
>>gives it some sway over organic evolution.
>
>Except that ID never actually commits to A designer by
>which it could be falsified.
Modern ID does, else it wouldn't have made the falsifiable predictions it makes to begin with.
>>Ah, so that's it. What happens in the filter
>>if the event involves both laws and random chance like
>>your example? Then it fits into one of the
>>"chance" nodes (e.g. IP), because on the whole
>>it has a finite chance of happening.
>
>Then I suppose EVERYTHING would fit into the chance
>node, as I know of nothing that doesn't have a finite
>chance of happening.
I worded it wrongly. It fits into the chance node because of the combination of chance and law makes it an intermediate probability, as I explained earlier.
>>>That's like saying a piece of a pecan pie is the same
>>>as the WHOLE pie, which doesn't make any sense.
>>
>>That's like saying integral estimations are inaccurate
>>because they don't use all the data, which doesn't
>>make any sense.
>
>And estimation by definition doesn't use all the data.
>That's quite a bit different than making an equality
>statement.
The explanatory filter admittedly makes empirically based non-proven conclusions, but science can provide nothing more. You are aware of the idea of approximate truth, correct?
>Nonetheless, even if the filter is completely valid,
>it doesn't mean anything because it doesn't mean that
>the filter is TRUE or RELEVANT as concerns reality,
>and THAT is the point I've been making this entire
>thread.
You have apparently forgotten what I meant by "valid." My point is that if it is given correct input, it reasonably yields correct output, and is therefore TRUE and RELEVANT as concerns reality.
>>For a counterexample to really work,
>>you'd need an example of an event in which neither law
>>nor chance can adequately explain, but the answer is
>>not design. Good luck with that.
>
>I think QM meets that criteria unless you are prepared
>to admit chaos as something that was also designed.
I've already disproved your counterexample and explained why it doesn't work.
>>There is nothing about this definition
>>that implies that an inference can't be rational or
>>reasonable.
>
>No, and there is nothing to imply that it, in fact,
>WILL BE reasonable or rational and that's the problem.
No it isn't. Let's review:
>Inferences are not rational by definition.
You and I have very different definitions. When I say “infer” I mean “the act or process of inferring.” What is inferring? In the definition I am using, it means, “to derive as a conclusion from facts or premises.” There is nothing about this definition that implies that an inference can’t be rational or reasonable.
Thus your claim has been proven false.
Now, given the scenario I described (the one with the magician), is “design” the most reasonable explanation?
>>I've already dealt with this, given two reasons why
>>this is flawed.
>
>Except you really didn't.
Yes I did.
You just basically said
>"Well, it isn't any business of psychology's" which it
>clearly is.
No, that were not my reasons.
>>Yep, but in general when we attribute design we don't
>>do so when nature is too easily capable of it.
>>Suppose we find an icicle. It could be made
>>artificially, but we generally don't make a design
>>inference.
>
>Sometimes we do because we don't know all that nature
>is capable of.
Irrelevant to the point I made.
>Some rock formations look designed like
>tables or faces and it's extremely hard to tell
>whether or not they were in fact designed.
Upon close examination it usually isn't that hard. Note the example of the arrowhead and the boot.
>The currents of nature COULD account for it, but
>because we know people generally do things with
>language and because the Rosetta stone looks like
>something that falls within the parameters we know
>people can design, we infer that it was in fact
>designed.
Perhaps nature could (technically) do it, but the event is as I said "not bloody likely." Think back to my magician scenario.
>>Life may have no known purpose but could just as
>>easily fall into one of these categories (e.g.
>>aesthetic). Just because we don't know for certain
>>the purpose is not problematic.
>
>It BECOMES problematic because we don't know the
>purpose AND we know that it doesn't fall within the
>parameters of design that we can expect from humans.
Big deal. Note the example of robots on Pluto. We know humans didn't design it, nonetheless that fact becomes irrelevant. The specification and LP criterion are still met. Let’s not forget that design inferences aren’t limited to humanly created things (contrary to what your claims seem to be). You are aware of the SETI program, correct?
>>What if we see humans make life from its
>>basic components but there are still no known natural
>>means and the old paradigm still has its unresolved
>>problems? What then?
>
>If humans MAKE life, then we know that it can be MADE
>which means that there is a possibility that it WAS
>made to begin with. However, knowing that something
>CAN be made does not mean that it was in fact made and
>it doesn't mean that we should simply flock to design
>as the answer to all of our woes.
But it does (in this scenario) mean that ID has a known means, whereas the other theory does not have a known means and still has many unresolved problems that the other theory accounts for and explains.
And apart from philosophical preference, there's apparently no reason not to accept ID.
>>Additionally, you have repeatedly avoided an important
>>question of mine that I would (please) like you to
>>answer. How long should we put up with the current
>>paradigm's unresolved problems before we switch to the
>>new paradigm that solves (and even predicts) those
>>kinds of problems?
>
>"The new paradigm" is not very promising for reasons I
>stated earlier but the answer to your question is
>"until something better comes along" and that
>something better is so far not ID.
You have still not answered the question. Like it or not, ID explains and even predicts the problems of the old paradigm. Suppose the predictions of the new paradigm (ID) continue to be confirmed, and the old paradigm still has its unresolved problems that the new paradigm accounts for and explains. How long should we put up with the current paradigm’s unresolved problems before we switch to the new paradigm that solves (and even predicts) those kinds of problems? How many more decades of fruitless research in resolving the problems with the current paradigm should continue before accepting ID? Thirty years? A century? Never?
For you, it’s beginning to look a lot like “never.”
>>How many more decades of
>>fruitless research in resolving the problems with the
>>current paradigm should continue before accepting
>>ID? Thirty years? A century? Never? Should we
>>just accept the old paradigm no matter what?
>
>No, we should accept it until something better comes
>along.
So I take it then that no matter how long ID's predictions are confirmed, no matter how long the problems remain unresolved, the new paradigm should never be accepted? It will never be "better"? Even if the new paradigm has a known cause and mechanisms, whereas the other theory does not have a known cause (naturalistic formation) and will still have many unresolved problems that the other theory accounts for and explains, it should not be accepted? No matter how long this goes on?
Why wouldn't be "better"? Because you just don't like it philosophically?
>>I believe it is perfectly acceptable to try and solve
>>the old paradigm's problems before switching to a new
>>one. But at some point I think we must give up the
>>old paradigm if the problems remain unresolved (given
>>a new paradigm that solves those problems etc.).
>
>Yes, that's true, but the point at which you give up
>on the old paradigm is when the new ones are clearly
>superior and don't appeal to things like supernatural
>causes.
The new paradigm (ID) doesn't appeal to supernatural causes. Let's get that straight right now. And given the circumstances described in the scenario, why wouldn't be "better"? Because you just don't like it philosophically?
>>Like it or not, modern ID theory makes these
>>kinds of testable and falsifiable predictions. And
>>there is reason to believe about this aspect of
>>the designer: lots of unresolved problems with
>>naturalistic explanations.
>
>Problems with one theory don't automatically support
>another
Perhaps not, but the theory does predict that such problems would exist nonetheless, like it or not.
>>There's nothing inherently
>>wrong with having a theory that makes falsifiable
>>predictions.
>
>No, there isn't, but when that theory picks and
>chooses certain initial conditions, it becomes awfully
>suspect.
In that case, all theories are suspect. The specifics of the theory are (in part) what make it responsible for making predictions. Look at the definition of ID theory, “Within biology, intelligent design is a theory of biological origins and development. Its fundamental claim is that intelligent causes are necessary to explain the complex, information-rich structures of biology and that these causes are empirically detectable.” If intelligent causes are necessary (if this theory were true), we should not expect natural causes to be sufficient, and thus we should not find any experimental demonstration to show how it could have happened without artificial intervention, and we would also expect problems and barriers for the naturalistic development scenario etc.
Like it or not, modern ID theory makes falsifiable predictions.
>>I didn't say "current form," nonetheless it is true
>>that this ad hoc hypothesis can (and has) been
>>used to prevent the empirical falsification of organic
>>evolution. My point remains the same: this
>>observation does nothing to falsify the theory of
>>organic evolution. Hence my claim that organic
>>evolution seems awfully non-falsifiable.
>
>When you make a straw man and you beat it with a
>stick, it pretty much doesn't do anything to fight
>back against the assumptions you stuffed it with.
Nice accusation, but it doesn't address the point I made. Abiogenesis does not appear to be falsifiable.
Problems with the theory? That's okay, because there are solutions to those problems and we just haven't discovered them yet. That is the general attitude towards abiogenesis, a perfect example of tenacity.
>>The problem with organic evolution is that this will
>>always happen. Look at both examples I made:
>>neither observation can falsify the theory. So what
>>could?
>
>Having the designer of life come down and having a
>chat.
Apart from that--and time travel observations etc. What reasonable scientific observation with life itself and natural processes be made to falsify it? What non-fantastical observation could be made?
And so long as the designer doesn't come down, we can stick with the old paradigm no matter how long the unresolved problems exist, no matter if there is a new paradigm that predicts the existence of such problems etc.?
And even then it isn't clear that this observation would falsify the theory. All one would have to do is say, "That's not the designer, he's lying!"
>>That’s nice. But you still didn't answer my question.
>> Given the scenario I depicted earlier: life began to
>>exist and the odds of organic evolution being true are
>>less than one in a trillion. Would you still accept
>>organic evolution in spite of the evidence?
>
>As opposed to?
As opposed to rejecting organic evolution. Now please answer my question.
>>>and the choices on this test are not a)
>>>organic evolution or b) design.
>>
>>Perhaps you can point to another?
>
>It would be a little hard to point to things which
>aren't yet known, wouldn't it?
I didn't think you could point to another. You do remember the game of inference to the best explanation, right?
>>Yes, the form of ID chosen is testable and
>>falsifiable. Dembski did indeed define a theory
>>called "intelligent design" that makes falsifiable
>>predictions. But so what? I wouldn't blame
>>evolutionists for choosing forms of evolutionary
>>theory that are testable and falsifiable. The
>>"premises" are an inherent and unavoidable part of
>>nearly any scientific theory. For instance, atomic
>>theory uses its premises to fit the data (the Bohr
>>model rejected in place of something else etc.). The
>>specifics of the theory are often what makes it
>>scientific, testable, and able to make falsifiable
>>predictions. It is something to be commended, not
>>criticized.
>
>Mostly it has to do with the fact that ID is an
>attempt to smuggle God in the back door at the end of
>the day.
You can make that claim all you like, but it isn't a valid reason to reject the theory. The stated motive for Newton in his theories was to promote belief in God. But that didn't make the theories themselves religious or illegitimate.
Additionally, we must assess the theory itself, not its adherents. The content of the theory itself is not religious. It makes no appeals to a deity or the supernatural.
>>As I explained before, because they are made by the
>>same designer.
>
>And why would any designer besides a human have cause
>to use the same pieces over and over?
I have explained this before, e.g. convenience.
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