Author:
Wade A. Tisthammer
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Date Posted: 04/13/05 3:57pm
In reply to:
Damoclese
's message, "chortle" on 04/11/05 5:57pm
>>That’s not quite true. Many analogies have been made
>>regarding the complexity of life and machines (read
>>Michael Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box and you’ll
>>see what I mean). And if we do attribute design based
>>on experience, what happens when our experience tells
>>us humans can artificially create life but no known
>>natural causes can?
>
>It tells me we can manipulate life and the building
>blocks as we know them. Adding a chocolate-coated
>syrup to a cookie isn't exactly MAKING a cookie, just
>as modifying RNA and DNA isn't EXACTLY making life.
You’re missing the point. Already we humans can do things that known natural processes cannot (outside a pre-existing cell), such as making DNA and RNA. It is entirely conceivable that there will be known artificial causes to create life but no known natural ones. In that case, what does your apparent proposal of detecting design (the “we’ve already seen humans make these things” idea) say about this? What happens regarding design attribution regarding this experience?
>>Wouldn’t ID at least be a
>>reasonable scientific theory? Or is it
>>something to be avoided at all (evidential) costs?
>
>It is a possibility, but it's not really rigorous
>enough to be called a scientific theory.
Why not? The old paradigm (e.g. organic evolution) is hardly “rigorous” in any mathematical sense. Indeed, much of evolution (on the biochemical level) is far from rigorous by having only handwaiving explanations. But design can be very rigorous in principle (e.g. find a rigorous explanation how DNA could be artificially made) and already it appeals to rigorous technical details (veracious or not, the irreducible complexity of a system can be defined and supported rigorously via rigorous biochemical details). But if organic evolution is sufficiently rational to believe it should be accepted as a scientific theory, agreed? Now, even if it was rational to believe ID, science should pretend not to know it? And besides, you still didn’t answer my question. Putting it in full context:
I’m sure you’ve heard of something called inference to the best explanation. We have an old paradigm with some unresolved problems. There is a new paradigm that solves and even predicts those problems. Or consider a little down the road when there are known artificial causes to produce life but no known natural ones (still unresolved problems with the old paradigm). Wouldn’t ID at least be a reasonable scientific theory? Or is it something to be avoided at all (evidential) costs?
>>Well, that’s what I’ve been talking about. IF
>>the filter is fed accurate information, it reliably
>>detects design. If law and chance are inadequate,
>>design is chosen. I really don’t see why that should
>>be so controversial.
>
>Because there is one scenario that I'd already pointed
>out where it would fail. Let's say we see order in the
>pattern of electrons hitting a detector screen via
>some quantum mechanical process. It APPEARS that these
>electrons were specifically ordered a certain way by a
>designer;
Why?
>in other words the order produced LOOKS
>designed, (the specification criteria is met) but we
>know that by their very nature the process that
>produced them is entirely random.
But if that were true (the knowledge of their nature), then it would stop in the “chance” node. Your counterexample fails.
>>The
>>filter can’t possibly work without taking into account
>>the situation.
>
>It apparently does, because it only takes pieces of
>the situation into consideration.
Even if true, it takes into account the situation nonetheless and the filter is valid.
>>Given the title of the book (The Design
>>Inference) I’m sure Dembski would agree with you
>>on some level. But you didn’t answer my question.
>>Would you really believe the precisely ordered cards
>>happened by chance?
>
>Given the situation that a magician was the one doing
>the trick, I'd be suspicious that it wasn't chance. If
>it were a complete novice, well then, that changes
>everything doesn't it?
No, because the evidence would still overwhelmingly point to design.
>>By describing the pattern in advance, he was perfect
>>for helping the specification criterion being met.
>
>Yeah, but the fact that he is a MAGICIAN is not
>accounted for at all
It is accounted for when deciding whether law/chance is the most likely explanation. And even if it weren’t accounted for, the filter still succeeds and the logic is still valid. Law and chance being eliminated, design is chosen.
>>Given this scenario, I’d say the odds of design being
>>correct are 1 – 10-67. But even if I
>>couldn’t give the precise odds, it doesn’t really
>>matter. Why? Science has no rigorous procedure for
>>determining to what extent the evidence confirms a
>>theory. It has no percentages. But this does not
>>take away the validity of the explanatory filter.
>>Given the small probability and the specification
>>criterion, design really is the most rational
>>explanation.
>
>No, it isn't the most "rational" explanation.
Really? I doubt you even believe the words you have typed. Let’s recap the scenario. If the magician said in advance what he was going to do, and after shuffling the cards, the entire deck is in the precise order he specified, you would really not think “design” is the most rational explanation? Would you think chance is responsible instead? I doubt it.
>>But it is consistent with reality. The filter
>>has a pretty big tendency to work whenever it’s used.
>
>Just because something has a "pretty big tendency" to
>work does not mean it is a model consistent with
>reality.
And just because the known physical laws are consistent every time we test them doesn’t mean they’re proven. But it’s certainly a good sign.
>>With such events, it picks law/chance whenever the
>>situation warrants.
>
>How? (remember my above example about QM)
Well, if we know the nature of electrons would reasonably produce that pattern, then law/chance would have been chosen. Exactly how it is chosen will depend upon the situation.
>>>1) It's an inadequate model in light of modern
>>>psychological research.
>>
>>Psychological research on humans is irrelevant.
>
>So a model about the way humans make attributions
>which falls under the authority of psychology makes
>psychological researh irrelevant when it comes to
>examining it eh?
One: I was concerned primarily with the logical validity of the filter, remember? Two: your alleged psychological claims seem dubious at best. Suppose that comparison with things we know are designed does in fact occur. Well, the things that we know are designed also happen to be things that the currents of nature are not reasonably capable of producing (e.g. cars, computers, artifacts). If you walked up to an archaeologist and claimed that so-and-so artifact (e.g. Rosetta Stone) could have been produced naturally, she’s likely to say something along the lines of “not bloody likely.” When design is chosen, law/chance are (even if implicitly) eliminated.
>>Even if
>>humans did a completely different means of estimating
>>integrals, it wouldn’t change the fact that the
>>mathematical estimations still work.
>
>But just because something WORKS doesn't mean it is
>RIGHT.
Yep, just a theory empirically works in all tested cases doesn’t mean it’s right. But it’s a pretty good sign. What are you expecting? A rigorous proof? Doesn’t happen in science.
>>It’s unclear what you mean by “DRIVES” the numbers.
>
>I mean that the specification criteria is meant to
>lend credibility to the numbers used as probability.
Not really. But it is an important factor in the filter.
>>The specification criterion is used after the
>>probability has been determined.
>
>Yeah, but it means to try to legitimize those numbers.
No. It does try to use them however.
>>I disagree. I honestly believe that people think
>>that, for the Rosetta Stone, Stonehenge, Mount
>>Rushmore etc. the currents of nature are not
>>reasonably capable of producing such things.
>
>Actually, the currents of nature COULD produce those
>things, but it isn't very likely.
Yes, not very likely. The currents of nature are not reasonably capable of producing those things. Think back to my archaeologist example.
And you seem to be glossing over many of the details involved. For instance, erosion tends to erode the soft parts more than the hard parts. But if the soft and hard parts are equally “chipped away” to form, say, an arrowhead, design is chosen (as opposed to finding a rock the shape of a boot, with the softer parts more worn than the harder ones).
>One of the reasons
>we know they are designed is because they have utility
>be they mathematical, aesthetic, or language oriented.
Ha! The Smithsonian has lots of artifacts with no known purpose but are obviously designed.
>ID proposes a designer and conveniently doesn't
>mention with respect to WHAT KIND of designer we might
>expect
False. It predicts the designer would make things that (among other things) resist naturalistic explanation. This makes are design inference strong because (among other things) there are empirically falsifiable predictions. How about organic evolution? Lately it seems awfully non-falsifiable. Don’t have the starting conditions here? Well, maybe it originated naturally in space. Or maybe there are ways to produce life and we just haven’t discovered them yet. Lots of problems of organic evolution? That’s okay, because there are solutions and we just haven’t discovered them yet etc. Give me one bit of empirical data and I bet I could explain it away easily (playing devil’s advocate of organic evolution). In contrast, modern ID theory seems much more at risk with empirical data. By philosophy of science, it’s organic evolution that doesn’t seem to be much of a scientific theory.
>Hence, EVEN if aliens designed robots on Pluto, we
>still could ONLY make the inference that they were
>designed because these particular aliens were enough
>like humans to make robots; something we know humans
>make because they have utility.
What if there is no known utility and the robots are completely unlike any robots we’ve made? Design can still be rationally inferred. And what if humans can artificially create life and no known natural processes can? In such a case, life is something we know humans can create etc.
>>So if the odds of organic evolution being true are
>>less than one in a trillion, you still wouldn’t accept
>>design? And if asked why, you’d say, “Because design
>>has no odds of its own”?
>
>No, I'd do one of those things, but not for the
>attributed reason. I wouldn't accept design as THE
>answer because design is just a possibility--a
>possiblity without much supporting evidence from
>anywhere else.
So you claim. But would you still accept organic evolution in spite of the evidence? And I think design in this case is more than just a possibility; it is the most reasonable possibility. Given life had a beginning and that organic evolution is almost certainly false, why not accept design as the most reasonable explanation? It makes falsifiable predictions, all of its predictions are very well confirmed, and it seems to win the game of inference to the best explanation.
Do I detect the odor of tenacity?
>>Well, guess what. Atomic
>>theory has no odds of its own either, i.e. no rigorous
>>procedure to determine the percentage of its being
>>true based on the evidence. Nonetheless, we can
>>reasonably accept atomic theory as a reasonable
>>inference of the empirical data.
>
>That's true, but in your hypothetical scenario you
>asked me to accept design as true because something
>else was remotely likely.
Ever here of inference to the best explanation?
>Science doesn't ask me to
>accept atomic theory as true because other models are
>remotely likely ALONE, it gives me supporting evidence
>from other fields and observations from other areas.
A similar thing is true for ID. Message theory predicts organisms would have similar components, which is evidence for message theory (thus having other supportive evidence). Additionally, modern ID theory makes falsifiable predictions after all. Now it is true that evidence supporting ID will often be against organic evolution. But the reverse is also true. By your logic, we should never accept organic evolution because all it does it make ID theory unlikely.
>>If it were somehow
>>known that the odds of organic evolution being
>>true were one in a trillion, design would similarly be
>>the most reasonable inference. I don’t see how you
>>can reasonably believe otherwise.
>
>No, it would be A inference.
So would you still accept organic evolution in the face of the overwhelming evidence? Remember the game is inference to the best explanation.
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