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Date Posted: 21:26:07 09/20/01 Thu
Author: Chgo
Subject: "The golden age of intelligence is before us" and "The shadowy world of Special Operations"

Check out the current issue of www.Salon.com for a number of thought-provoking articles on current affairs. Since the magazine is moving articles around every day at the moment, I thought I'd post two that may be of particular interest as replies.


"The golden age of intelligence is before us"

"In a world in which borders are dissolving and bad guys conceal bombs in their pockets or steal millions by means of computers, the intelligence business is set for a golden age," wrote Robert Kaplan back in 1998 for the Atlantic Monthly. That golden age may have begun for real last week, when the terror attack on New York and Washington spurred our political leaders to pledge a war against terrorism that will largely be fought by expanded intelligence capabilities and small stealth squads of special forces.




"The shadowy world of Special Operations"

Last week's attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon ushered in what some military theorists have dubbed the "fourth generation of warfare." To fight this new kind of war, most experts believe, the Pentagon will rely heavily on its Special Operations arm, the unconventional class of warriors who specialize in counterterrorism, with an emphasis on lightning raids, sabotage, kidnapping, deep reconnaissance and the training of foreign insurgents.

The special operations community has long existed on the margins of the Pentagon, always in the shadows

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Replies:

[> "The golden age of intelligence is before us" -- Chgo, 21:30:10 09/20/01 Thu

"The golden age of intelligence is before us"

Robert Kaplan says fighting terrorism will require new rules for spying, but he predicts that fighting an "almost comic book evil" will lead to a revival.
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By Laura Rozen
Sept. 20, 2001 | "In a world in which borders are dissolving and bad guys conceal bombs in their pockets or steal millions by means of computers, the intelligence business is set for a golden age," wrote Robert Kaplan back in 1998 for the Atlantic Monthly. That golden age may have begun for real last week, when the terror attack on New York and Washington spurred our political leaders to pledge a war against terrorism that will largely be fought by expanded intelligence capabilities and small stealth squads of special forces.

The author of seven books, including "Balkan Ghosts" and "The Coming Anarchy," Kaplan has scanned the post-Cold War landscape from Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, to Ft. Bragg, N.C., which inspired his thinking about the future importance of intelligence and special forces. Known for his sober judgment and frequent pessimism, Kaplan was uncharacteristically optimistic about the U.S.'s capacity to recover from last week's terror and its aftermath. Salon interviewed Kaplan Wednesday by telephone at his home in western Massachusetts.

You have written about Islamic fundamentalism as a challenge to regimes in Egypt, in Pakistan. To people who say the U.S. got attacked because of its policies, particularly toward the Middle East, what do you say?

First of all, that's not why we got attacked. But that doesn't mean we're not going to have to make certain concessions in order to appease Arab moderates in order to help us in our struggle. We'll get help from a regime, and they'll ask us to put pressure on Israel over settlements, for instance.

The real cause of the attacks is that the terrorists have an existential hatred of the modern technological world, even though they use its toys. And that hatred exists because they see our world as the real challenge to Islam in a way that communism never was. Because communism was a failure, it was never seen as a challenge to them.

We really are a challenge. And also because the modern technological world is interpreted through an American prism. We've always represented the future. And our popular culture has the ability to suck up their new emerging middle classes -- in Egypt and other Islamic and developing countries -- because it's informal, it's not aristocratic -- it's jeans, computers, music. Because it's an informal culture, anyone can join it, and it becomes very enticing. And that's the threat. They hate us, but it's a type of respect.

You have traveled around the U.S. trying to understand where the country is headed. How do you think the attacks will change us as a country? What strengths and vulnerabilities have you observed?

Because we have had the dumb luck of geographical circumstance, until now we have been able to indulge ourselves in freedoms that other countries have not. We don't have to carry identity cards with us, like most Europeans. But we also tend to confuse convenience with liberty. And because of these freedoms, we tend to be that much more exposed. Historically, we have tended to denigrate the very parts of the bureaucracy like the intelligence services that have historically prevented these kinds of attacks.

The CIA functions badly because it's not been respected for decades. And when something's not respected, the best people are not attracted to join. What I see coming out of this is a kind of reform and resurgence of the CIA, like we saw in the U.S. military in the decade culminating in the Gulf War.

But there were umpteen television shows glorifying the CIA already set to air on the TV networks in the fall, before these attacks.

It's like pissing in an ocean. First of all, the Vietnam syndrome is over. The '60s are over. Assassinations will come back. Because there are no military targets. Yugoslavia's Slobodan Milosevic had water and electricity grids to bomb. I mean, once we kept Belgrade out of running water and power for a week, Milosevic surrendered. We are dealing with an enemy now where there is nothing to bomb. You have to kill people.

As I said in the Atlantic, the next war is going to be all about intelligence. The great golden age of intelligence is before us, and the greatest spies are just being born now. Future wars are going to be based on the size and quality of the intelligence services. Because in a world of complex, variegated cultures, understanding intent is more important than satellite photos. We need people who can melt into societies.

But no one who has traveled a lot abroad and has a lot of foreign acquaintances can get a security clearance within American diplomatic and intelligence agencies. They have self-selected people who have very limited foreign experience.

That's all going to change. I got an e-mail the other day from a friend at the State Department. He said the change has been dramatic. Before, it was "You can't do this because of this rule and that rule." Now, he said, you do it and break the rule. And nobody will punish you. It turns out that this kind of bureaucratic web of restrictions -- that's going to be wiped away in a second.

Was there anything that surprised you as you watched the pictures on TV of New York after the attacks?

It turns out that we weren't weak as a society. For so many decades, we had nothing to struggle for. We became decadent and overly legalistic. But once threatened, that changed.

What's your prediction for the coming days? Are you optimistic?

I'm very optimistic. If you look historically at America, America was coming apart into partisanship and hatred in the '30s -- Huey Long, Father Coughlin, all that. And then Hitler and Tojo came along, and it saved us. After World War II, the U.S. has experienced 50 years of dynamism. Out of World War II came the GI Bill, civil rights, the erosion of anti-Semitism -- all of this came out of World War II.

Without it, America would have rolled into decadence. But we have been a very lucky country. Every few decades, we are faced with almost comic-book evil. You are going to see: A lot will change.

I was not surprised by the tremendous civil spirit in New York for two reasons. The little reason is because New York has happened to have a very good mayor for the last eight years, not just for the last eight days. Rudolph Giuliani has spent the previous eight years restoring a sense of civil spirit in New York.

But there's a bigger reason. America is a country built of small communities. America's greatness is not its central government, but its weak central government with hundreds of small communities. And those are the real roots of this country's vibrancy. The New York story is very much an American story.

Another thing to note is that the Red vs. Blue map of Bush vs. Gore -- the east and west coasts of the country versus the middle -- has been detonated. If Cheney's health doesn't hold up enough to run next term, I could see a Bush-[New York Gov. George Pataki] ticket, and New York going Republican.

You have written on everything from the rise of nationalism and the end of communism in Eastern Europe, to Egypt's fight with the Islamic brotherhood, to the U.S. intelligence services, to Pakistan as a potential Yugoslavia with nukes. What are your thoughts as you have watched events unfold here after the terrorist attacks?

The first thing no one has realized yet is that these attacks mean the end of Wilsonian idealism. Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda are all off the charts, assigned to the sepia-toned 1990s. We can only afford to do good works abroad when security at home can be taken for granted.

Absent that luxury, foreign policy goes back to what it has traditionally been: cold national security.

Back to Kissinger and realpolitik?

Right. The U.S. can only engage in good works abroad when it doesn't face threats to national security at home.

America's historical experience, our sense of security, was based on being surrounded by two oceans. Our national security was created not by a smart security policy, but by the dumb luck of geography.

Now technology has bridged oceanic distance. The result is that we are now more vulnerable than at any time since the British burnt down the White House in 1814.
We're back to the period of the first three or four U.S. presidents, from George Washington to James Madison to John Adams. All realists. They were reading Greek and Roman history, not the life of Jesus Christ. Realism tends to thrive when people feel insecure.

The 20th century did not end until last week. The Balkans, the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo -- all of that was a kind of low-level extension of the Cold War -- a coda.

How was the Bosnian war still a part of the Cold War?

In the Balkan wars what we were basically witnessing was the cleaning up of the business of communist rule in Eastern Europe. Really, when you think about it -- if you could give it one cause -- what we saw the last decade in the Balkans was the refuse of communism. When Belgium and everywhere else became middle class in the 1950s, the Balkans lagged behind. I mean, you don't see French Canadians smuggling AK-47s up New York's Hudson River.

salon.com
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About the writer
Laura Rozen writes about U.S. foreign policy and the Balkans for Salon News.


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[> [> Re: "The golden age of intelligence is before us" -- Zzoo, 21:45:32 09/20/01 Thu

Fascinating articles. Thanks for posting them.


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[> "The shadowy world of Special Operations" -- Chgo, 21:31:59 09/20/01 Thu

The shadowy world of Special Operations

Any strike against bin Laden will rely heavily on the military's Special Forces, known for daring, high-risk raids that are all too often disastrous.
- - - - - - - - - - - -
By David J. Morris
-
Sept. 20, 2001 | Last week's attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon ushered in what some military theorists have dubbed the "fourth generation of warfare." To fight this new kind of war, most experts believe, the Pentagon will rely heavily on its Special Operations arm, the unconventional class of warriors who specialize in counterterrorism, with an emphasis on lightning raids, sabotage, kidnapping, deep reconnaissance and the training of foreign insurgents.

The special operations community has long existed on the margins of the Pentagon, always in the shadows. A unit insignia of an old Green Beret task force sums it up well: It features a large mushroom over which the words "Kept in the Dark, Fed Only Horseshit" are inscribed. The American military establishment has always had an uneasy relationship with these unconventional warriors. In fact, the joint special operations command, which includes all branches of the armed forces, was established only after the embarrassment of the disastrous Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980, code-named "Desert One."

For their part, special operations leaders feel their exceptional skills have never been properly appreciated by the generals, who almost always come from the more traditional branches of the service and who look at these alleged "super soldiers" as prima donnas, wild men and wasters of precious resources. But this may have changed with the elevation of Gen. Hugh Shelton to the position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997. Shelton had previously served as the commander of the Army's Special Operations command and rose higher than any previous officer with a Special Forces background.

In the past, working too long in the "spec ops" world was a sure way to end a promising career. This past Sunday, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld spoke to the nation with Shelton by his side, he seemed to be trying to heal all these old wounds when he bent over backward to praise America's Special Operations forces, saying "we may very well need more of them" for the coming war.

The current U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla., is made up of the Army's famed Delta Detachment, the Navy's SEAL Team Six, units of the 75th Army Ranger Regiment and selected Air Force squadrons. Born out of the ashes of the Desert One debacle, the command presides over America's dark soldiers, who have a disturbingly mixed record of daring and disastrous raids undertaken at phenomenal risk.

A major problem in attempting to assess the "spec ops" world is that one mainly hears about the missions that go wrong. Those that go right -- a terrorist apprehended, an attack foiled -- often remain a secret. Their most famous operations have been spectacular failures, from Desert One, to the ill-fated Ranger mission to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid in 1993 recounted in Mark Bowden's sobering "Black Hawk Down," to the exquisitely executed Son Tay raid in North Vietnam, which nonetheless failed to yield a single American POW as planned.

But special operators slogged on after these bitter defeats and achieved some victories, most of which the American public never hears about. (A special operator once told me that the only way that he knew a covert operation was underway was when he saw a pair of empty jump boots outside of the chapel at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, indicating that a Special Forces soldier had been killed on a mission.) A few stunning victories have made headlines: After several abortive attempts to capture elusive war criminals in northern Bosnia, sailors from the Navy's elite SEAL Team Six physically tackled a suspect in the street in December of 1998. Two other war crimes fugitives were also captured in this operation.

And the Army's Delta Force played a pivotal role in the pursuit and eventual assassination of Colombian cocaine king Pablo Escobar in 1993. That particular campaign bears some resemblance to the current battle confronting the U.S. military in Central Asia, pursuing Osama bin Laden and his allies. Escobar commanded a labyrinthine network of agents, couriers and bodyguards that practically smothered Colombia, and any offensive move by Colombian government forces was swiftly detected and counteracted by Escobar's lieutenants.

To win this war, American operatives began speaking of "bringing down the mountain," i.e., dismembering the intelligence matrix that Escobar sat atop which kept him alive. It was this systematic campaign of intense intelligence collection, counterintelligence and smart, surgically orchestrated strikes that eventually brought Escobar to his end. This type of war, fought against an equally insidious enemy, is likely what is being planned in USSOCOM's Crisis Action Center, deep in the bowels of MacDill.

The controversial, gray war fought against Pablo Escobar is considered by some in the "spec ops" world to be their crowning achievement. It proved that they could coordinate a shifting battle against a wily and fantastically elusive foe and, after numerous false starts, rebound and kill him (The facts surrounding Don Pablo's death remain hidden under the haze of uncertainty that characterizes all special operations. Officially, Colombian government forces killed him.) Much like bin Laden, Pablo Escobar was a nontraditional enemy who fought his pursuers not so much with guns and bombs as with his wits and his network. The lessons learned by America's special operators in this dark, quasi war will no doubt be applied in the coming months.

The highly specialized force that we have now didn't develop out of thin air. The special ops' military subculture traces its roots to the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, formed by President Roosevelt during the darkest days of World War II. The historical parallels here are far from accidental. The U.S. birthed the heterodox OSS in a time of national crisis and quickly disbanded its motley ranks after the Japanese surrender. The members of the OSS, many of them expatriates and roguish ne'er-do-wells, went on to form the nucleus of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army's Green Berets.

As in many fields of martial endeavor, the U.S. was preceded by the British in the development of a true special operations capability. The legendary Col. "Charging Charlie" Beckwith, a two-tour Vietnam vet with a swampy Georgia accent, formed the Army's Delta Detachment in 1977 in response to numerous well-publicized terrorist incidents around the world. Beckwith had spent a year as an exchange officer with Great Britain's Special Air Service, then the world leader in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist operations. This experience greatly influenced him as he began organizing and training the unusual body of men that would become "The Dreaded D."

Beckwith built upon an already elite group of Green Beret volunteers and transformed them into what is considered by some to be the premier surgical strike force in the world today. But, as in the Son Tay raid, one is continually faced with the problem of brilliantly executed tactics being hamstrung by poor decision-making by the generals -- and by shoddy and even downright false intelligence.

During Desert Storm, after Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf seemed to be doing everything in his power to exclude Delta and the SEALs from his master plan, several teams struck out into the shifting sands of Iraq in search of the elusive Scud missile launchers that were consistently evading U.S. warplanes. At this end of what the SAS dubbed the "Great Scud Hunt of '91," only a few missile launchers were confirmed as destroyed. In retrospect, it appears as if these raids were launched prematurely and lacked the necessary coordination required for special operations, which are exceptionally intelligence-intensive.

The long-term effect of engaging in a spec ops campaign on the scale being suggested by Rumsfeld and the Bush administration could be to almost completely upend the American military establishment. Historically, special operations have always been just that: "special," as in very rarely done. Deploying, supplying and recovering the forces necessary for the coming war will require a new and unseen type of commitment from our nation's military. But most importantly, the coming conflict will force Americans to look at warfare in a whole new light. In the past, the modus operandi of special operations has sometimes been perceived as underhanded, dirty, roguish and possibly un-American. But if this terrorist Pearl Harbor has taught us anything, it is that all the rules have changed.

salon.com
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About the writer
David J. Morris is a former officer in the Marine Corps with a background in special operations. He teaches writing at San Diego State University.


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[> [> Good articles, Chgo--thanks for sharing them. I've heard this new type of warfare referred to as "asymmetric" (as opposed to the old "symmetric" model involving armies, tanks, etc.) LFN's depiction of Section One, as an elite anti-terrorist unit that doesn't play by the accepted rules, was in many ways remarkably prescient. -- Susan W, 22:13:48 09/23/01 Sun


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